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ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS IN LITIGATION
Douglas R. Richmond*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Assume for a moment that you represent a party in a property dispute and
sue the opposing landowner in federal court. The district court determines that it
lacks jurisdiction over the matter and dismisses the case, further holding that you
should be sanctioned for filing the action.1 As a sanction, the district court orders you
to take and pass a law school class on federal jurisdiction.2 You appeal and the
appellate court agrees that the sanction was inappropriate. Unfortunately, it
disapproves of the sanction largely because it would burden a law school to accept a
practicing lawyer as a student.3 The appellate court believes that “it would be more
appropriate” for you to attend continuing legal education (CLE) courses on federal
court practice and it thus encourages the district court to consider such a sanction on
remand.4 Your appellate victory is perhaps not Pyrrhic—after all, a law school course
would be expensive and impose an inflexible time and examination commitment, so
a CLE mandate represents some improvement—but nor is it a win worth celebrating.
Alternatively, consider the consequences of the lawyers’ incivility in
Huggins v. Coatesville Area School District.5 In Huggins, the plaintiff’s lawyer,
Lewis Hannah, and a defense lawyer, James Ellison, had “heated, personal, rude, and
pointless” exchanges during a deposition.6 Hannah was the provocateur and
“ratcheted the acrimony higher and the standards lower,” but Ellison gave as good
as he got.7 The defendants thereafter moved for a protective order and for sanctions.8
Instead of ordering Hannah to pay the defendants’ costs and fees incurred in bringing
the motion—which the court rejected as a sanction based on Ellison’s complicity—
the court selected a sanction intended to “have greater long-term substantive effect.”9
The court required Hannah to attend a CLE course addressing civility and
professionalism, and ordered Hannah and Ellison to join each other for a meal within
a few weeks, Dutch treat, in an attempt to repair their professional relationship.10
* Managing Director, Aon Professional Services, Overland Park, Kansas. J.D., University of
Kansas School of Law. Opinions expressed here are the author’s alone.
1. Willhite v. Collins, 459 F.3d 866, 869–70 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing the imposition of sanctions
based on Rule 11 and the district court’s inherent powers).
2. Id. at 870.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Huggins v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., Civ. A. No. 07-4917, 2009 WL 2973044 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
16, 2009).
6. Id. at *1.
7. See id. at *1–2.
8. See id. at *2.
9. Id. at *4.
10. Id.
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A Florida federal court also went beyond mandatory CLE attendance as a
sanction when a plaintiff’s lawyer, Aryn Fuller, missed a pretrial conference, failed
to submit a confidential case statement for a settlement conference, was late for the
first day of trial, and did not have a witness available at trial as required.11 The court
ordered Fuller to join the Federal Bar Association (FBA), attend a FBA webinar on
federal civil litigation basics, and arrange for a mentor through the FBA.12
Finally, consider Oklahoma lawyer Gerard Pignato’s sanction for
“unprofessional letters” he sent to opposing counsel.13 The court directed him “to
submit to the Oklahoma Bar Journal for publication an article pertaining to civility
and professionalism as they relate to adversary proceedings.”14 The court further
ordered Pignato to state in the article why wrote it, target as his audience
inexperienced lawyers, and provide the court with a copy of the article upon its
submission for publication.15 Pignato wrote a conforming Oklahoma Bar Journal
article that was published within the time allotted by the court, although the
published version of the article made no mention of why he wrote it.16 Other courts
have likewise required lawyers to write bar journal articles as a sanction.17
The non-monetary sanctions imposed on these lawyers may fairly be
characterized as alternative sanctions; they were imposed instead of monetary
sanctions or traditional non-monetary sanctions that affect a lawyer’s ability to
litigate a case, such as revoking the lawyer’s pro hac vice admission. Alternative
sanctions may further be categorized as reflective sanctions where they are intended
to cause offending lawyers to reflect on their conduct with a goal of reform, or as
shaming sanctions where they are intended to shame errant lawyers into improving
their behavior and, in addition, to deter other lawyers from engaging in similar
misconduct. Ordering a lawyer to attend a CLE program is the most common
example of a reflective sanction.18 This sanction requires no public

11. Order Imposing Sanctions at 1, Sindicich v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., Case No. 6:14-cv-889-Orl37KRS,
2016
WL
3563874
(M.D.
Fla.
July
1,
2016),
https://www.scribd.com/document/287281291/Sindicich-Sanctions-Order-1.
12. Id.
13. Order at 1, Johnson v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., Case No. CIV-07-868-M (W.D. Okla. Apr. 14,
2008) (imposing non-monetary sanctions).
14. Id. at 2.
15. Id.
16. See Gerard F. Pignato, Professionalism for Attorneys—Young and Old, 79 OKLA. B.J. 2827
(2008), http://www.okbar.org/Portals/13/PDF/OBJ/2008/December%2013.pdf.
17. See, e.g., St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Commercial Fin. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 518 (N.D. Iowa
2000) (sparing the lawyer some embarrassment by stating that did not have to say in the article that he
was required to write it as a sanction).
18. Judges routinely require lawyers to attend CLE programs as a sanction for litigation-related
misconduct. See, e.g., In re Vialet, 460 F. App’x 30, 40–41 (2d Cir. 2012) (requiring the lawyer to
complete 12 hours of CLE in addition to the hours normally required of New York lawyers); In re Hsu,
451 F. App’x 37, 39 (2d Cir. 2011) (requiring the lawyer to complete a CLE course on each of three
specified subjects); Edmonds v. Seavey, 379 F. App’x 62, 64–65 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming the district
court’s Rule 11 sanction requiring a lawyer to “attend CLE courses in the relevant area” because he did
“not appear to comprehend the civil RICO statute”); Willhite v. Collins, 459 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2006)
(suggesting mandatory CLE courses as a sanction rather than making the lawyer complete a law school
class); Balthazar v. Atl. City Med. Ctr., 137 F. App’x 482, 490–91 (5th Cir. 2005) (affirming the district
court’s order that the lawyer attend two CLE courses, one on federal practice and procedure and one on
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acknowledgement of error or wrongdoing by the lawyer. In most cases, no other
lawyers will know why the sanctioned lawyer is attending a particular CLE course.
At the same time, judges who order lawyers to attend CLE programs do not believe
that the lawyers will change their behaviors or improve their practices solely as a
result of the content delivered during those seminars. Rather, self-analysis by the
lawyer of the need to change her behavior or enhance her professional knowledge or
skills is a principal goal of mandatory CLE attendance, even if it is not the only goal.

professional responsibility); Thomas v. Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co., No. 00-30056, 2001 WL
274750, at *1–2 (5th Cir. Feb. 22, 2001) (approving a sanction of five hours of CLE courses in lieu of
awarding attorneys’ fees); In re Marshall, No. 3:15-MC-88-JWD, 2016 WL 81484, at *8, *12 (M.D. La.
Jan. 7, 2016) (ordering the lawyer to complete six hours of CLE on ethics or professionalism in addition
to other sanctions for repeatedly failing to meet deadlines, disregarding court rules, and failing to appear
for a scheduling conference); Burrage-Simon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 2:14-cv-00429GMN-NJK, 2015 WL 5224885, at *1, *6 (D. Nev. Sept. 8, 2015) (ordering the lawyer to attend an ethicsbased CLE course in addition to paying a monetary sanction); Broussard v. Lafayette Consol. Gov’t, No.
6:13-cv-2872, 2015 WL 5025345, at *6–8 (W.D. La. Aug. 20, 2015) (ordering the lawyers to complete
in the next 17 months 21 hours of CLE courses in addition to any CLE credit otherwise required or
completed); Wise v. Wash. Cty., No. 10-1677, 2015 WL 1757730, at *37 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2015)
(requiring the plaintiff’s lawyers to attend CLE courses; one of the lawyers had to attend two courses, the
other had to attend only one); Howard v. Offshore Liftboats, LLC, Nos. 13-4811, 13-6407, 2015 WL
965976, at *11 (E.D. La. Mar. 24, 2015) (relying on FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(2) in ordering a lawyer to
“attend an additional five (5) hours of continuing legal education over and above what he is required to
attend . . . all of which must be in the area of professionalism and/or ethics” as a sanction for his
“unprofessional personal insults” directed at opposing counsel during depositions); Cruz-Aponte v.
Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 123 F. Supp. 3d 276, 278–81 (D.P.R. 2015) (ordering a lawyer to complete
a professionalism course for saying, “You’re not going through menopause, I hope,” to a female lawyer
who complained about the heat in the room where depositions were being taken); Rivas v. Bowling Green
Assocs., No. 13-cv-7812 (PKC), 2014 WL 3694983, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014) (ordering the
plaintiff’s law firm to “require each partner or member of the firm admitted to practice before this [c]ourt
who practices in the field of litigation to attend a continuing education program” on topics specified by
the court); Torres v. City of Houston, Civ. A. No. H-12-2323, 2013 WL 2408056, at *10 (S.D. Tex. May
31, 2013) (ordering the plaintiff’s attorney “as a remedial and prophylactic measure more than a sanction”
to complete 14 hours of CLE courses “in addition to the CLE required of all active attorneys,” and further
mandating that the specified courses could not be taken on-line); Santini v. Cleveland Clinic Fla., Case
No. 98-6559-CIV-ZLOCH, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23667, at *81 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 1999) (ordering the
lawyer to obtain five hours of CLE credit on legal ethics within one year in addition to other sanctions);
Bullard v. Chrysler Corp., 925 F. Supp. 1180, 1191 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (sanctioning the lawyer under Rule
11 and requiring him to complete 10 hours of CLE on legal ethics in addition to other penalties); LaVigna
v. WABC Television, Inc., 159 F.R.D. 432, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (ordering the lawyer to attend 12 hours
of CLE programming in addition to paying a $250 fine); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat’l Corp., 893 F.
Supp. 827, 833 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (offering the lawyers the alternative of petitioning to vacate monetary
sanctions by agreeing to successfully complete specified CLE seminars); In re Morton, Case No. 3:15bk-30892-SHB, 2015 WL 5731859, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2015) (requiring two lawyers “to
attend ten hours of ethics continuing legal education above what is required for maintaining their
Tennessee law licenses,” in addition to imposing significant monetary penalties and requiring the lawyers
to report themselves to Tennessee disciplinary authorities); Goldberg v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr. of Greater
Miami, LLC (In re S. Beach Cmty. Hosp.), Case No. 06-10634-BKC-LMI, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2780, at
*3, *10 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. July 3, 2007) (requiring the lawyer to attend a full-day professionalism course
as a sanction for disagreeing with the court’s reasoning during oral argument by stating: “I suggest with
respect, Your Honor, that you’re a few French Fries short of a Happy Meal in terms of what’s likely to
take place.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Shaming sanctions, as the description suggest, include a demonstration or
display of penitence by errant lawyers.19 Pignato’s case offers a good example of a
shaming sanction; it would be a perfect example had his Oklahoma Bar Journal
article stated the reason for its publication as the court ordered.
Alternative sanctions became a subject of concern and controversy among
practicing lawyers when in 2014 the district court in Security National Bank of Sioux
City v. Abbott Laboratories,20 acting on its own, sanctioned a lawyer from a leading
global law firm for misconduct during depositions she defended.21 The lawyer’s
misconduct included (1) making an “astounding number” of improper objections; (2)
repeatedly objecting and interjecting in ways that coached witnesses how to answer
questions; and (3) excessively interrupting the depositions, thereby delaying and
frustrating witnesses’ examinations.22 While the court’s decision to sanction the
lawyer on its own rather than in response to a motion by another party was itself
noteworthy, the court’s shaming sanction in particular attracted lawyers’ attention:
Counsel must write and produce a training video in which Counsel,
or another partner in Counsel’s firm, appears and explains the
holding and rationale of this opinion, and provides specific steps
lawyers must take to comply with its rationale in future depositions
in any federal and state court. The video must specifically address
the impropriety of unspecified “form” objections, witness
coaching, and excessive interruptions. The lawyer appearing in the
video may mention the few jurisdictions that actually require only
unspecified “form” objections and may suggest that such
objections are proper in only those jurisdictions. The lawyer in the
video must state that the video is being produced and distributed
pursuant to a federal court’s sanction order regarding a partner in
the firm, but the lawyer need not state the name of the partner, the
case the sanctions arose under, or the court issuing this order.23
The court additionally required the lawyer to obtain its approval of the
video, and thereafter to make it known and available to each lawyer her global law
firm who engaged in federal or state litigation or who worked in any practice group
in which at least two of the lawyers had appeared in any federal or state case in the
United States.24 The lawyer also had to demonstrate compliance with the order by

19. See, e.g., DeLuca v. Seare (In re Seare), 515 B.R. 599, 621 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014) (affirming a
lower court’s sanction order requiring the lawyer to provide a copy of that order to certain potential clients
for the next two years “as a means of informing the bar that being disciplined for unethical conduct has
repercussions beyond just paying a fine and moving on”); Salmon v. CRST Expedited, Inc., Case No. 14CV-0265-CVE-TLW, 2016 WL 3945362, at *4 (N.D. Okla. July 19, 2016) (requiring a novice lawyer “to
speak to students at the University of Tulsa College of Law about the dangers of filing a lawsuit as a
licensed legal intern” as a sanction for filing a frivolous lawsuit; also ordering the young lawyer to pay
$3,000 in attorneys’ fees).
20. 299 F.R.D. 595, 600 (N.D. Iowa 2014), rev’d sub nom. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Jones
Day, 800 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2015).
21. Id. at 610–11.
22. Id. at 600.
23. Id. at 610 (footnote omitted).
24. Id.
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filing an affidavit along with a copy of the notice about the video that was circulated
within the firm.25
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court, but in doing so it did not
criticize the choice of sanction.26 Rather, it reversed because “[s]o unusual a sanction
required the district court to give particularized notice of the nature of the sanction it
had in mind so that counsel would have a meaningful opportunity to respond,” and
the district court did not provide such notice.27 Indeed, the nature of the district
court’s sanction became known only when it issued its opinion.28 As a result, the
alternative sanction could not stand.29
The district court and Eighth Circuit decisions in National Bank of Sioux
City require courts and lawyers to focus attention on alternative sanctions against
lawyers. This Article is intended to help guide them in that process. It begins in Part
II with an overview of the sources of courts’ authority or power to sanction lawyers,
focusing on bases for imposing alternative sanctions and highlighting illustrative
cases as appropriate. In discussing sanctions premised on procedural rules, Part II
focuses on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather than state rules simply because
the federal case law is well-developed. Finally, Part III focuses on the richly
illustrative decision in Security National Bank of Sioux City and the broader lessons
to be learned from that case.
II.

COURTS’ AUTHORITY TO SANCTION LAWYERS

Depending on the case, courts may impose alternative sanctions on lawyers
(a) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and state equivalents; (b) under several
rules of civil procedure beyond Rule 11; and (c) pursuant to their inherent power to
regulate the conduct of those who appear before them. Other common bases for
sanctioning lawyers, such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, 28 U.S.C. § 1927,
and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 do not permit alternative sanctions.
A.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 is perhaps the best-known basis for
imposing sanctions. Rule 11 governs lawyers’ misconduct in presenting pleadings,
written motions, and other papers to courts.30 Rule 11 does not apply to disclosures
under Rule 26 or to discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions.31
Regarding documents and related conduct within its scope, Rule 11(b) provides:
(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a
pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by signing,
filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or

25. Id.
26. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Jones Day, 800 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2015).
27. Id. at 945.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE § 5(C)(1), at 89–90
(5th ed. 2013).
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(d).
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unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose,
such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument
for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the
evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably
based on belief or a lack of information.32
Rule 11(c) governs sanctions for violations of Rule 11(b):
(c) Sanctions.
(1) In General. If, after notice and a reasonable
opportunity to respond, the court determines that Rule
11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an
appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party
that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.
Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm must be
held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its
partner, associate, or employee.
(2) Motion for Sanctions. A motion for sanctions must be
made separately from any other motion and must describe
the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b).
The motion must be served under Rule 5, but it must not
be filed or be presented to the court if the challenged
paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn
or appropriately corrected within 21 days after service or
within another time the court sets. . . .
(3) On the Court’s Initiative. On its own, the court may
order an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why
conduct specifically described in the order has not
violated Rule 11(b).

32. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
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(4) Nature of a Sanction. A sanction imposed under this
rule must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of
the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly
situated. The sanction may include nonmonetary
directives; an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if
imposed on motion and warranted for effective
deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of
part or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other
expenses directly resulting from the violation.
***
(6) Requirements for an Order. An order imposing a
sanction must describe the sanctioned conduct and
explain the basis for the sanction.33
States have adopted their own versions of Rule 11.34
Under Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11 applies “in
all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts, except as stated
in Rule 81.”35 Rule 11 therefore applies in actions and proceedings based on both
diversity and federal question jurisdiction.36 The limitation in Rule 1 that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure apply to civil matters in district courts clarifies that Rule
11 does not apply to appellate proceedings,37 with the possible exception of certain
securities actions.38 Likewise, Rule 11 does not apply in criminal cases or in
bankruptcy cases; lawyers’ misconduct in those cases is punished or remedied under
other authorities.39
The standard for determining whether Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate
depends on how the question is raised. When weighing the appropriateness of Rule
11 sanctions based on a party’s motion, courts employ an objective standard of
reasonableness.40 When imposing sanctions on their own initiative under Rule
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
34. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-211 (2012); MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.03.
35. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. Rule 81 identifies the federal proceedings to which the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do and do not apply. See FED. R. CIV. P. 81.
36. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989) (“We give the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure their plain meaning.”).
37. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 406 (1990).
38. See Gurary v. Nu-Tech Bio-Med, Inc., 303 F.3d 212, 225–26 (2d Cir. 2002) (discussing the
PSLRA and stating that “[o]nce the presumption [against plaintiffs in unfounded and abusive securities
fraud cases] is triggered and is not rebutted, however, it seems most likely that Congress meant for the
defendant to receive fees and costs incurred in seeking sanctions . . . including all reasonable expenses
related to appellate proceedings.”).
39. JOSEPH, supra note 30, § 5(B)(1), at 87 (“While misbehavior in criminal cases may be punishable
under other authorities, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the inherent power of the court[,] . . . it is not
sanctionable under Rule 11.”); 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012) (governing bankruptcy cases and stating that
“[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of this title.”); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011 (providing a Rule 11 equivalent in bankruptcy
proceedings).
40. See Hourani v. Mirtchev, 796 F.3d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Montell v. Diversified Clinical Servs.,
Inc., 757 F.3d 497, 510 (6th Cir. 2014).
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11(c)(3), on the other hand, courts should apply a standard similar to that used to
support sanctions for contempt.41 The contempt standard is stricter or more stringent,
although the precise standard may vary by jurisdiction.42 Regardless, requiring a
higher standard for sanctions imposed by a court sua sponte under Rule 11(c)(3)
reduces the risk that by sanctioning a lawyer, a district court will “inadvertently
dampen attorneys’ legitimate, zealous advocacy on behalf of clients.”43 A stricter
standard may further be justified on the basis that lawyers tempting sanctions under
Rule 11(c)(3) do not enjoy the safe harbor provision of Rule 11(c)(2) that would
otherwise allow them to correct or withdraw the offending papers.44
Rule 11 grants courts a great deal of flexibility in fashioning sanctions, as
long as the sanction a court selects is “appropriate” and is “limited to what suffices
to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly
situated.”45 This means that a court should impose the least severe sanction required
to accomplish Rule 11’s purposes.46 Rule 11(c)(4) expressly provides for alternative
sanctions, which it refers to as “nonmonetary directives.”47 Courts may, for example,
order lawyers to participate in CLE programs,48 as they often do, but their creativity
in crafting appropriate sanctions certainly does not stop there.49 In Curran v. Price,50
for example, the court was looking to fashion a non-monetary sanction against a
lawyer, Timothy Umbreit, who tried to remove a case to federal court “that was not

41. See Muhammad v. Walmart Stores E., 732 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2013); McDonald v. Emory
Healthcare Eye Ctr., 391 F. App’x 851, 853 (11th Cir. 2010); Stone v. Wolff Props. LLC, 135 F. App’x
56, 59 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. R&D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102, 1116 (9th Cir.
2001)).
42. Compare Muhammad, 732 F.3d at 108 (requiring “a finding of subjective bad faith” for
contempt), with Pousson v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 432, 437 (2009) (concluding that the defendant’s “gross
negligence and a gross lack of diligence” met the standard for civil contempt).
43. Rankin v. City of Niagara Falls, 293 F.R.D. 375, 387 (W.D.N.Y. 2013).
44. McDonald, 391 F. App’x at 853; see also In re Nakhuda, 544 B.R. 886, 899–902 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2016) (taking the same approach under FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011, the bankruptcy counterpart to FED. R.
CIV. P. 11).
45. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1), (4).
46. Jenkins v. Methodist Hosps. of Dallas, Inc., 478 F.3d 255, 265 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Thomas
v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 877–78 (5th Cir. 1988)).
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4).
48. See, e.g., Edmonds v. Seavey, 379 F. App’x 62, 65 (2d Cir. 2010) (calling the Rule 11 sanction
requiring the offending lawyer to attend CLE courses “particularly apropos”); Carlino v. Gloucester City
High Sch., 44 F. App’x 599, 601–602 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming order under Rule 11 requiring lawyer to
attend two CLE courses within 18 months in addition to other sanctions); Broussard v. Lafayette Consol.
Gov’t, Civ. A. No. 6:13-cv-2872, 2015 WL 5025345, at *6–8 (W.D. La. Aug. 20, 2015) (relying on Rule
11 in ordering the lawyers to complete 21 hours of extra CLE courses); Thomason v. Norman E. Lehrer,
P.C., 182 F.R.D. 121, 131–32 (D.N.J. 1998) (relying on Rule 11 in ordering the lawyer to complete two
CLE courses within 18 months); Bullard v. Chrysler Corp., 925 F. Supp. 1180, 1191 (E.D. Tex. 1996)
(sanctioning the lawyer under Rule 11 and ordering him to take 10 hours of CLE on legal ethics in addition
to other penalties).
49. See JOSEPH, supra note 30, § 16(B)(1), at 270 (“There are few limits placed on judicial creativity
in fashioning an appropriate sanction.”); see, e.g., Reinhardt v. Gulf Ins. Co., 489 F.3d 405, 417 (1st Cir.
2007) (affirming the district court’s order that the lawyer perform ten hours of pro bono service as a
sanction for violating Rule 11).
50. 150 F.R.D. 85 (D. Md. 1993).
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removable under any conceivable notion of federal removal jurisdiction.”51 While
noting that non-monetary sanctions are intended to be educational,52 the court
declined to make Umbreit attend a CLE course principally because it doubted that a
CLE course would fill this gap in his knowledge of federal law.53 Rather:
[A] more laser-like approach [was] warranted, consisting of
remedial education in federal removal law, to be gained and
reinforced through the mnemonic device of copying appropriate
materials out in longhand. . . .
Specifically . . . Umbreit . . . [was] . . . directed to copy out,
legibly, in his own handwriting, and within 30 days . . . the text
(i.e., without footnotes) of section 3722 in 14A C. Wright, A.
Miller, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil
(1985), together with the text of that section’s update. . . . Mr.
Umbreit [was required to] turn in the resulting product to the Clerk
of this Court, with a certification that it was made solely by himself
and in his own handwriting. This sanction [was] . . . the least
drastic—and likely a very effective—way of impressing the
appropriate principles of federal removal jurisdiction upon
counsel’s long-term memory.54
In another Rule 11 alternative sanctions case, Fields v. Gates,55 the
plaintiffs’ lawyer filed false civil cover sheets in several cases and dismissed another
case in an attempt to draw a particular judge, which the court and the defendants
characterized either as forum-shopping or judge-shopping.56 The defendants moved
for sanctions under Rule 11 and sought to have the case dismissed.57 The court
instead ordered the plaintiffs’ lawyer to “enroll and attend at an accredited law school
a full course in ethics and professional responsibility.”58
B.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Beyond Rule 11

While Rule 11 and courts’ inherent power are perhaps the most frequently
cited bases for imposing alternative sanctions, federal courts may also impose
alternative sanctions on lawyers under various Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 85.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 87.
Id.
184 F.R.D. 342 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
Id. at 344–45.
Id. at 345.
Id.
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Rule 16

The first of these rules is Rule 16, which governs pretrial conferences.59
Rule 16(f) provides:
(1) In General. On motion or on its own, the court may issue any
just orders, including those authorized by Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii)–
(vii), if a party or its attorney:
(A) fails to appear at a scheduling or other pretrial
conference;
(B) is substantially unprepared to participate—or does
not participate in good faith—in the conference; or
(C) fails to obey a scheduling or other pretrial order.
(2) Imposing Fees and Costs. Instead of or in addition to any other
sanction, the court must order the party, its attorney, or both to pay
the reasonable expenses—including attorney’s fees—incurred
because of any noncompliance with this rule, unless the
noncompliance was substantially justified or other circumstances
make an award of expenses unjust.60
A Rule 16(f) violation does not require a finding of bad faith, although a
court may consider a lawyer or litigant’s bad faith in settling on an appropriate
sanction.61
Rule 16(f) permits courts to impose alternative sanctions on lawyers,62 and
they freely do so using the rule as authority.63 Petrisch v. JP Morgan Chase64 is an
illustrative case. In Petrisch, the court relied on Rule 16(f) to sanction the plaintiff’s
lawyer, Stephen Jackson, for failing to appear for a pretrial conference and for
violating various scheduling and pretrial orders.65 “To remedy the injury to the
[c]ourt” for wasting its time, the court ordered Jackson to attend four hours of CLE
courses on federal practice and procedure within the next year.66 The courses had to
be approved by state CLE authorities and conducted in a live classroom format, and

59. FED. R. CIV. P. 16.
60. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f).
61. Hogan v. Raymond Corp., 536 F. App’x 207, 211 (3d Cir. 2013).
62. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f)(1) (empowering courts to “issue any just orders” when a party or lawyer
commits a listed offense); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f)(2) (providing for the payment of reasonable expenses
“[i]nstead of or in addition to any other sanction”).
63. See, e.g., Burrage-Simon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 2:14-cv-00429-GMN-NJK, 2015
WL 5224885, at *1, *6 (D. Nev. Sept. 8, 2015) (ordering the lawyer to attend an ethics-based CLE course
in addition to imposing a monetary sanction for violating Rule 16(f) by willfully missing a settlement
conference).
64. 789 F. Supp. 2d 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
65. Id. at 455.
66. See id. at 456.
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were to be in addition to those hours required for members of the New York State
Bar or any other state bar to which Jackson belonged.67
2.

Rule 26

Next there is Rule 26(g), which governs the signature of Rule 26(a)
disclosures, and discovery requests, responses, and objections. Rule 26(g) states in
pertinent part:
(1) Signature Required; Effect of Signature. Every disclosure
under Rule 26(a)(1) or (a)(3) and every discovery request,
response, or objection must be signed by at least one attorney of
record in the attorney’s own name—or by the party personally, if
unrepresented—and must state the signer’s address, e-mail
address, and telephone number. By signing, an attorney or party
certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information,
and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry:
(A) with respect to a disclosure, it is complete and correct
as of the time it is made; and
(B) with respect to a discovery request, response, or
objection, it is:
(i) consistent with these rules and warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law,
or for establishing new law;
(ii) not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or
needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and
(iii) neither unreasonable nor unduly
burdensome or expensive, considering the needs
of the case, prior discovery in the case, the
amount in controversy, and the importance of
the issues at stake in the action.
***
(3) Sanction for Improper Certification. If a certification violates
this rule without substantial justification, the court, on motion or
on its own, must impose an appropriate sanction on the signer, the
party on whose behalf the signer was acting, or both. The sanction
may include an order to pay the reasonable expenses, including
attorney’s fees, caused by the violation.68

67. Id.
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g).
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A lawyer’s certification is tested as of the time the disclosure or discovery
document was signed.69 Whether a reasonable inquiry has been made is evaluated
under a standard of objective reasonableness.70 In deciding whether to impose
sanctions for violating Rule 26(g)(1), “the court must avoid hindsight and resolve all
doubts in favor of the signer.”71
Because the imposition of sanctions under Rule 26(g)(3) depends on the
signature of a disclosure or discovery document in violation of Rule 26(g)(1), courts’
ability to invoke the rule to remedy litigation misconduct is severely circumscribed.72
That said, where a lawyer violates Rule 26(g)(1) without substantial justification, the
court must sanction the lawyer, the party the lawyer represents, or both.73 “Rule
26(g)(3) gives the judge discretion over the nature of the sanction but not whether to
impose one.”74 Courts may impose reflective or shaming sanctions on lawyers under
the rule, as St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Commercial Financial Corp.75 illustrates.
In St. Paul the defendant, CFC, moved for an expedited trial setting under
Rule 57 and, in the process, cited a discovery objection by the plaintiffs that allegedly
evidenced their plan to make the litigation as burdensome as possible for CFC.76 This
caused the district court to scrutinize the plaintiffs’ discovery objections and it did
not like what it saw: “In almost every respect . . . each objection asserted by the
plaintiffs [was] boilerplate, obstructionist, frivolous, overbroad, and, significantly,
contrary to well-established and long standing federal law.”77 Unwilling to tolerate
the plaintiffs’ “egregious” discovery abuse, the district court raised the issue of Rule
26(g) sanctions on its own initiative.78
After examining several representative improper objections, the court
turned to Rule 26(g).79 The court determined that the principal signer and exclusive
draftsman of the plaintiffs’ discovery responses was their out-of-state counsel, and
concluded that his certification of the objections fell far below any objective standard
of reasonableness.80 In selecting a sanction, the court noted that while Rule 26(g)
permitted it to make the lawyer pay CFC’s attorneys’ fees and costs, other sanctions
were available.81 The court also noted that while the objections were “obstructionist,
69. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment (“The certification speaks as
of the time it is made.”); JOSEPH, supra note 30, § 42(C)(2), at 641.
70. United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., Nos. 96-16770, 9616869, 1999 WL 362836, at *1 (9th Cir. June 4, 1999).
71. Bergeson v. Dilworth, 749 F. Supp. 1555, 1566 (D. Kan. 1990).
72. See McGuire v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 12-cv-10797, 2015 WL 1757312, at *6 (E.D. Mich.
Apr. 17, 2015) (“A necessary prerequisite to imposing sanctions under Rule 26(g)(3), per the text of the
rule, is a certification that violates Rule 26(g)(1).”).
73. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3).
74. Rojas v. Town of Cicero, 75 F.3d 906, 909 (7th Cir. 2015); see also McHugh v. Olympia Entm’t,
Inc., 37 F. App’x 730, 741 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Sanctions under Rule 26(g)(3) are not discretionary if the
district court finds that a discovery filing was signed in violation of the rule.”).
75. 198 F.R.D. 508 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
76. Id. at 510–11.
77. Id. at 511.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 515.
80. Id. at 516–17.
81. Id. at 516.
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frivolous and deplorable,” the lawyer’s explanation for them—that he was
exasperated by the scope of the discovery requests and was surprised by the
bitterness of the litigation—was “believable, but not justifiable.”82 Thus, rather than
fining him, the St. Paul court fashioned what it considered to be a lesser sanction:
[C]ounsel shall . . . write an article explaining why it [was]
improper to assert the objections that he asserted in this case.
Counsel shall submit the article to both a New York and Iowa bar
journal . . . , however, he is not required to mention in the article
that it was written pursuant to a sanction order. Counsel shall have
120 days from December 1, 2000, in which to comply with this
order. In addition, counsel shall submit an affidavit stating that he
alone researched, wrote, and submitted the article for publication,
indicating which journals he submitted the article to, as well as
submitting a copy of the article to this court.83
Concluding, the court warned the lawyer that failing to prepare the article
as instructed could result in additional sanctions.84
3.

Rule 30

Rule 30, which governs depositions by oral examination,85 also provides a
basis for sanctioning lawyers. Under Rule 30(d)(2), a court “may impose an
appropriate sanction—including the reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees
incurred by any party—on a person who impedes, delays, or frustrates the fair
examination of the deponent.”86 By referring to “a person” when identifying who a
court may sanction for a violation, Rule 30(d)(2) plainly permits courts to sanction
lawyers.87
Unlike sanctions under Rule 26(g)(3), sanctions imposed under Rule
30(d)(2) are not mandatory; the decision to sanction a violator is entrusted to the
district court’s discretion.88 A lawyer need not act in bad faith to be sanctioned under
Rule 30(d)(2).89 Rather, the question for a court considering sanctions under the rule

82. Id. at 517.
83. Id. at 518.
84. Id.
85. FED. R. CIV. P. 30.
86. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(2).
87. See Zottola v. Anesthesia Consultants of Savannah, P.C., No. CV411-154, 2012 WL 6824150, at
*6 (S.D. Ga. June 7, 2012) (stating that Rule 30(d)(2) allows for sanctions against lawyers).
88. See, e.g., Pain Ctr. of SE Ind., LLC v. Origin Healthcare Sols., LLC, No. 1:13-cv-00133-RLYDKL, 2015 WL 5775455, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2015) (concluding that Rule 30(d)(2) sanctions were
not warranted); Brady v. Grendene USA, Inc., No. 12cv604-GPC (KSC), 2015 WL 5177760, at *3 (S.D.
Cal. Sept. 4, 2015) (declining to impose Rule 30(d)(2) sanctions).
89. Hylton v. Anytime Towing, No. 11CV1039 JLS (WMc), 2012 WL 3562398, at *2 (S.D. Cal.
Aug. 17, 2012); Layne Christensen Co. v. Bro-Tech Corp., Civil Action No. 09-2381-JWL-GLR, 2011
WL 6934112, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 30, 2011) (distinguishing Rule 30(d)(2) sanctions from 28 U.S.C. §
1927 sanctions); Applebaum v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, No. CV 2007–0916(DLI)(MDG), 2011 WL
8771843, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2011) (differentiating Rule 30(d)(2) from 28 U.S.C. § 1927); GMAC
Bank v. HTFC Corp., 248 F.R.D. 182, 196 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
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is whether the lawyer’s conduct delayed, frustrated, or impeded the fair examination
of the deponent.90 Courts may impose Rule 30(d)(2) sanctions sua sponte.91
While Rule 30(d)(2) permits a court to award an aggrieved party its
reasonable expenses and attorneys’ fees as a sanction for a person’s obstructionist
behavior in connection with a deposition, that is not the only permissible sanction.92
This flexibility is apparent from the rule’s (1) reference to “an appropriate
sanction,”93 and (2) use of the illustrative term “including” to introduce the types of
sanctions available to courts.94 In short, the rule allows courts to impose reflective
and shaming sanctions on lawyers for deposition misconduct.95
4.

Rule 37

Rule 37 permits courts to sanction parties and lawyers for various forms of
discovery abuse.96 In addition to penalizing misconduct in discovery, sanctions
imposed under Rule 37 are intended to deter similar misconduct by others,
compensate the court and affected parties for any expenses attributable to the

90. See e.g., Applebaum, 2011 WL 8771843, at *6 (quoting the rule and the 1993 advisory committee
notes); Dunn v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-01660-GMN-VCF, 2013 WL 5940099, at *1 (D. Nev.
Nov. 1, 2013) (“First, the court must determine whether a person’s behavior has impeded, delayed, or
frustrated the fair examination of the deponent.”); Sicurelli v. Jeneric/Pentron, Inc., No.
03CV4934(SLT)(KAM), 2005 WL 3591701, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2005) (“[F]or purposes of Rule
[30(d)(2)], a clear showing of bad faith on the part of the attorney against whom sanctions are sought is
not required. Instead, the imposition of sanctions under Rule [30(d)(2)] requires only that the attorney’s
conduct frustrated the fair examination of the deponent.”).
91. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Jones Day, 800 F.3d 936, 942 (8th Cir. 2015); Tajonera v. Black
Elk Energy Offshore Operations, L.L.C., Civ. A. Nos. 13-0366 et al., 2015 WL 5178418, at *7 (E.D. La.
Sept. 3, 2015).
92. See, e.g., Claypole v. Cty. of Monterey, Case No. 14-cv-02730-BLF, 2016 WL 145557, at *5
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2016) (requiring a lawyer to donate $250 to the Women Lawyers Association of Los
Angeles as a sanction for a sexist remark directed at opposing counsel during a deposition, as well as
imposing fees and costs); Carroll v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 12-cv-00007-WJM-KLM,
2014 WL 859238, at *11 (D. Colo. Mar. 4, 2014) (striking an expert witness’s testimony and excluding
him as a Rule 30(d)(2) sanction); Mazzeo v. Gibbons, No. 2:08-cv-01387-RLH-PAL, 2010 WL 3020021,
at *2 (D. Nev. July 27, 2010) (admonishing two lawyers for deposition misconduct and sanctioning them
by “memorializing their misconduct in this order”).
93. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(2).
94. See Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. State Superintendent of Educ., 746 F.3d 1145, 1150 n.13 (11th Cir. 2014)
(explaining that the term “include” when used to introduce a category, group, or list is intended to be
illustrative rather than exhaustive or exclusive); Paxson v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 87, 658 N.E.2d
1309, 1314 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (“We, too, find the word ‘including’, in its most commonly understood
meaning, to be a term of enlargement, not of limitation.”); Md. Cas. Co. v. NSTAR Elec. Co., 30 N.E.3d
105, 110 (Mass. 2015) (quoting P.R. Mar. Shipping Auth. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 645 F.2d
1102, 1112 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1981)); Beaver Dam Cmty. Hosps., Inc. v. City of Beaver Dam, 2012 WI App
102, ¶ 14, 344 Wis.2d 278, 822 N.W.2d 491 (adhering to the general rule that “‘include’ is a term of
illustration or inclusion, not one of limitation or exclusion”).
95. See, e.g., Howard v. Offshore Liftboats, LLC, Civ. A. Nos. 13-4811, 13-6407, 2015 WL 965976,
at *11 (E.D. La. Mar. 4, 2015) (relying on Rule 30(d)(2) in ordering a lawyer to “attend an additional five
(5) hours of continuing legal education over and above what he is required to attend in Texas, all of which
must be in the area of professionalism and/or ethics” as a sanction for his “unprofessional personal insults”
directed at opposing counsel during depositions).
96. JOSEPH, supra note 30, § 47(A), at 674.
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offending party’s abuses, and compel compliance with discovery rules.97 Although
parties are generally the focus of sanctions under Rule 37, lawyers may be sanctioned
under Rule 37(b)(2)(C) for unjustifiably advising a party not to comply with a
discovery order,98 under Rule 37(d)(3) for unjustifiably advising a party not to attend
its own deposition or not to respond to written discovery,99 or under Rule 37(f) for
failing to participate in good faith in developing and submitting a Rule 26 discovery
plan.100 Sanctions, however, are limited to the payment of reasonable expenses,
including attorneys’ fees, attributable to the abuses.101 Alternative sanctions are not
an option for courts using Rule 37 to remedy misconduct in discovery.102
C.

28 U.S.C. § 1927

Rules of civil procedure furnish but one source of authority for sanctioning
lawyers for misconduct in litigation. In federal courts, lawyers may also be
sanctioned under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which states:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any
court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred
because of such conduct.103
Unlike Rule 11, § 1927 applies to cases in federal appellate courts as well
as to district court cases.104 Section 1927, again unlike Rule 11, applies to criminal
cases as well as to civil matters.105
A lawyer’s conduct “multiplies proceedings” when it results in proceedings
that would not have occurred otherwise.106 To be sanctionable under § 1927, a
lawyer’s conduct must multiply the proceedings “unreasonably and vexatiously.”107
Courts uniformly reason that bad faith conduct satisfies the vexatiousness
requirement.108 Reckless conduct will also satisfy the vexatiousness requirement in
97. Id.
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C).
99. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d)(3).
100. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f).
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d)(3); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f).
102. See, e.g., Gowan v. Mid Century Ins. Co., No. 5:14-CV-05025-LLP, 2015 WL 7274448, at *4
(D.S.D. Nov. 16, 2015) (declining the plaintiff’s request to require the defendant to produce a discovery
video as an alternative sanction in part because sanctions were being sought under Rule 37 rather than
Rule 30).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012).
104. JOSEPH, supra note 30, § 21(A)(1), at 427.
105. Id. § 21(B), at 431.
106. Daniels v. Sodexo, Inc., No. 8:10-cv-00375-T-27AEP, 2013 WL 4008744, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Aug.
5, 2013).
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012).
108. See, e.g., Boyer v. BNSF Ry. Co., 824 F.3d 694, 708 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining that both
objective and subjective bad faith will support § 1927 sanctions); Blixseth v. Yellowstone Mountain Club,
LLC, 796 F.3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 2015) (requiring subjective bad faith for sanctions under § 1927); In
re Prosser, 777 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2015) (“A court imposing § 1927 sanctions must find bad faith, but
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many jurisdictions,109 regardless of whether it is assessed independently or is
considered to fall within the definition of “bad faith” in this context.110 Negligent
conduct, however, will not support sanctions under § 1927.111
There is a split of authority regarding the reach of § 1927 and, more
particularly, whether a law firm as compared to an individual lawyer may be
sanctioned under the statute.112 The statute’s reference to “[a]ny attorney or other
person admitted to conduct cases in any court” would seem to clearly indicate that
law firms are not subject to sanctions under § 1927.113 This is the conclusion reached
by the Sixth,114 Seventh,115 and Ninth Circuits.116 The Fourth Circuit has expressed
doubt that § 1927 permits sanctions against laws firms, but has not decided the
issue.117 In contrast, the Second,118 Third,119 Eleventh,120 and District of Columbia121
Circuits allow law firms to be sanctioned under § 1927. The reasoning of the courts

that finding need not be made explicitly.”); EEOC v. Great Steaks, Inc., 667 F.3d 510, 522 (4th Cir. 2012)
(“Bad faith on the part of the attorney is a precondition to imposing fees under § 1927.”); Star Mark
Mgmt., Inc. v. Koon Chun Hing Kee Soy & Sauce Factory, Ltd., 682 F.3d 170, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2012)
(requiring bad faith or conduct akin to bad faith for sanctions).
109. See, e.g., Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Doubletree Partners, L.P., 739 F.3d 848, 871–72 (5th Cir.
2014) (requiring evidence of bad faith, improper motive, or reckless disregard of the lawyer’s duties to
the court for sanctions); Grochocinski v. Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw, LLP, 719 F.3d 785, 799 (7th Cir.
2013) (quoting Kotsilieris v. Chalmers, 966 F.2d 1181, 1184–85 (7th Cir. 1992)); Braunstein v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Transp., 683 F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lahiri v. Universal Music & Video Distrib.
Corp., 606 F.3d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 2010)); Hamilton v. Boise Cascade Express, 519 F.3d 1197, 1202
(10th Cir. 2008) (explaining that any conduct, viewed objectively, that manifests intentional or reckless
disregard of a lawyer’s duties to the court, is sanctionable under § 1927).
110. See, e.g., Young Apts., Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 503 F. App’x 711, 725 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Bad
faith is an objective standard that is satisfied when an attorney ‘knowingly or recklessly pursues a frivolous
claim or engages in litigation tactics that needlessly obstruct the litigation of non-frivolous claims.’”)
(quoting Amlong & Amlong, P.A. v. Denny’s, Inc., 500 F.3d 1230, 1242 (11th Cir. 2007)); Peer v. Lewis,
606 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Bad faith is an objective standard that is satisfied when an attorney
knowingly or recklessly pursues a frivolous claim.”).
111. Boyer, 824 F.3d at 708; Salkil v. Mount Sterling Twp. Police Dep’t, 458 F.3d 520, 532 (6th Cir.
2006).
112. It appears that the Tenth Circuit has yet to address this issue. See Medtronic Navigation, Inc. v.
BrainLab Medizinische Computersystems Gmbh, Civ. A. No. 98-cv-01072-RPM, 2008 WL 410413, at
*10 (D. Colo. Feb. 12, 2008) (noting the split of authority on whether § 1927 authorizes fee awards against
law firms and stating that the Tenth Circuit has not addressed this issue). At least one district court in the
Tenth Circuit has concluded that law firms may be sanctioned under § 1927, but other district courts in
the circuit have held that only individual lawyers may be sanctioned. Compare id. (“Liability should be
borne by the firm. If section 1927 does not support an award of fees against [the law firm] as an entity,
then such an award is appropriate under the court’s inherent authority.”), with Sangui Biotech Int’l, Inc.
v. Kappes, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1245 (D. Colo. 2002) (concluding that sanctions under § 1927 may not
be imposed on law firms).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012).
114. BDT Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742, 750–51 (6th Cir. 2010).
115. Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 2005).
116. Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290, 1293 (9th Cir. 2015).
117. Blue v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 549 (4th Cir. 1990).
118. Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 147–48 (2d Cir. 2012).
119. Baker Indus., Inc. v. Cerberus Ltd., 764 F.2d 204, 208–212 (3d Cir. 1985).
120. Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1582 (11th Cir. 1991).
121. LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 146 F.3d 899, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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permitting sanctions against law firms under the statute, however, is either suspect
or non-existent.122 For example, the Second Circuit coarsely reasoned that “[t]here
is no serious dispute that a court may sanction a law firm pursuant to its inherent
power. We see no reason that a different rule should apply to § 1927 sanctions, and,
in any event, we have previously upheld the award of § 1927 sanctions against a law
firm.”123 But with all due respect to the judges of the Second Circuit, courts’ inherent
power to sanction is not granted or enforced pursuant to a clear and unambiguous
statute.124 Different rules may indeed support different approaches,125 and while stare
decisis is a preferred judicial approach, it “is not an inexorable command.”126 Nor,
for that matter, is there any need to extend § 1927 to law firms when a court may
invoke its inherent power to sanction a law firm for the same type of conduct that is
punishable under the statute.127
The plain text of § 1927 indicates that it provides no basis for alternative
sanctions; only monetary penalties are available under the statute and even those are
limited to the excess costs, expenses, and fees incurred by virtue of the lawyer’s
wrongful multiplication of the proceedings.128 At least one court, however, arguably
appears to have relied on § 1927 in imposing alternative sanctions. In Moser v. Bret
Harte Union High School District,129 the court sanctioned a lawyer defending the
school district in an education law case for multiple misstatements,
mischaracterizations and misrepresentations in summary judgment briefing, many
frivolous objections in summary judgment briefing, and personal attacks on the
plaintiff and his lawyer.130 The “only reasonable inference” to be drawn, the court
concluded, was that the lawyer, Elaine Yama, and her law firm “intended to obstruct
at every step and stand education law on its head.”131 As for the sanction:
Under FRCP Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the Court’s inherent
powers, Ms. Yama is ordered to personally pay Plaintiff and his
counsel $5,000 for the increased costs and expenses related to
causing Plaintiff’s need to repeatedly respond to Defendant’s
blatant misrepresentations, throughout the four year history of this
litigation; Ms. Yama is PUBLICALLY REPROVED and ordered
to attend 20 hours of CLE ethics training in programs approved by

122. See, e.g., id. at 904–907 (failing even to discuss the effect of the limiting “[a]ny attorney or other
person admitted to conduct cases in any court” language).
123. Enmon, 675 F.3d at 147.
124. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S.
626, 630–31 (1962)).
125. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1) (authorizing courts to impose appropriate sanctions on law
firms), with cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (authorizing monetary sanctions against “[a]ny attorney or other
person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory”).
126. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
127. JOSEPH, supra note 30, § 21(C)(2), at 435–36.
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012).
129. 366 F. Supp. 2d 944 (E.D. Cal. 2005).
130. Id. at 953–76.
131. Id. at 976.
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the California State Bar Association . . . and must submit proof of
such training to the Court. . . . 132
Unfortunately, the opinion is unclear. One possible interpretation of this
language is that the court imposed all three sanctions on Yama (excess costs and
expenses, public reproval, and mandatory CLE) under each of the three sources of
authority it cited: Rule 11, § 1927, and its inherent powers. Another possible reading
is that the court publicly reproved Yama and ordered her to attend CLE courses under
either Rule 11 or its inherent powers or both, and assessed excess costs and expenses
against her under § 1927. The second alternative is preferable because the court
would then be properly applying the statute, but that interpretation is by no means
certain. In any event, the opinion’s ambiguity coupled with the plain statutory
language robs Moser of any persuasive value in advocating for alternative sanctions
under § 1927. Moser certainly has no precedential value.133
D.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38

Although most lawyers think of sanctions as a trial court peril, appellate
courts may also impose sanctions, as we saw in the discussion of 28 U.S.C. § 1927.134
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 provides another basis for appellate
sanctions. Rule 38 states that “[i]f a court of appeals determines that an appeal is
frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court and
reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to
the appellee.”135 Sanctions for pursuing a frivolous appeal are discretionary with the
appellate court—not mandatory.136 An appeal is frivolous for purposes of the rule
when “‘the result is obvious or when the appellant’s argument is wholly without
merit.’”137 Sanctions may also lie where an appeal is filed for improper purposes or
the appellant makes only cursory arguments.138
Rule 38 is silent as to the possible targets of sanctions, but it is clear that
courts may rely on it to sanction lawyers.139 It is equally clear from the language of
the rule that any sanctions must be monetary—alternative sanctions are not an option
for courts.

132. Id. at 988.
133. See Vertex Surgical, Inc. v. Paradigm Biodevices, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231 (D. Mass. 2009)
(“As Judges Posner and Easterbrook have repeatedly and accurately observed, with characteristic
bluntness, district court decisions are neither authoritative nor precedential.”).
134. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
135. FED. R. APP. P. 38.
136. Blixseth v. Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, 796 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015).
137. Duff v. Cent. Sleep Diagnostics, LLC, 801 F.3d 833, 844 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting McCoy v.
Iberdrola Renewables, Inc., 769 F.3d 535, 538 (7th Cir. 2014)).
138. Id.
139. Salata v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 757 F.3d 695, 700–701 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Rule 38 allows us to impose
sanctions against an appellant or an appellant’s attorney.”); Ransmeier v. Mariani, 718 F.3d 64, 69 (2d
Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled that an attorney’s conduct on appeal as well as the arguments he makes may
expose him to sanctions both under our inherent power and under the proscriptions of 28 U.S.C. § 1927
and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.”).
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Courts’ Inherent Power to Sanction

Courts’ ability to sanction lawyers and parties for misconduct in litigation
extends beyond the authority granted by procedural rules and statutes.140 Courts may
also sanction lawyers and parties pursuant to their inherent power to regulate the
conduct of those who appear before them.141 This is true of federal142 and state143
courts alike. Courts’ inherent power to sanction lawyers and parties to vindicate their
authority exists separate and apart from their power of contempt.144
Courts must exercise caution and restraint when exercising their inherent
powers.145 At a minimum, a court considering sanctions under its inherent power
must ensure that it understands the facts and law underpinning its decision.146
Inherent power sanctions are generally justified only where the offender (1) willfully
disobeys a court order;147 or (2) acts in bad faith.148 But while the willful
140. See Parsi v. Daioleslam, 778 F.3d 116, 130 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (observing that “[i]n addition to
sanctions contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” courts possess “an inherent power at
common law” to impose sanctions).
141. See Sciarretta v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 1205, 1212 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Courts have
the inherent power to police themselves and those appearing before them.”); Ransmeier, 718 F.3d at 68
(“Our authority to impose sanctions is grounded, first and foremost, in our inherent power to control the
proceedings that take place before this [c]ourt.”); Shepherd v. Am. Broad. Cos., 62 F.3d 1469, 1475 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (stating that a court may sanction both lawyers and parties pursuant to its inherent powers);
Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 2 F.3d 1397, 1411 (5th Cir. 1993) (saying “there
is no doubt” that courts may sanction lawyers under their inherent powers); Tom v. S.B., Inc., 280 F.R.D.
603, 610 (D.N.M. 2012) (observing that “courts have an inherent power to sanction attorneys and
parties”).
142. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43–44 (1991).
143. Rush v. Burdge, 141 So. 3d 764, 766 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); In re Estate of Weatherbee, 2014
ME 73, ¶ 9, 93 A.3d 248, 253; Wong v. Luu, 34 N.E.3d 35, 44–45 (Mass. 2015); Maldonado v. Ford
Motor Co., 719 N.W.2d 809, 810 (Mich. 2006); A.J.H. ex rel. M.J.H. v. M.A.H.S., 364 S.W.3d 680, 682
(Mo. Ct. App. 2012); Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 951 A.2d 947, 967 (N.J. 2008); State ex rel. King
v. Advantageous Cmty. Servs., LLC, 2014-NMCA-076, ¶ 12, 329 P.3d 738, 741; Supplee v. Miller-Motte
Bus. Coll., Inc., 768 S.E.2d 582, 600 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting In re Small, 689 S.E.2d 482, 485
(N.C. Ct. App. 2009)); Utz v. McKenzie, 397 S.W.3d 273, 281 (Tex. App. 2013); Maxwell v. Woodall,
2014 UT App 125, ¶ 5–11, 328 P.3d 869, 871–74; Env’t Specialist, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank Nw., N.A.,
782 S.E.2d 147, 149 (Va. 2016) (citing and discussing Nusbaum v. Berlin, 641 S.E.2d 494, 501–502 (Va.
2007)); State v. Merrill, 335 P.3d 444, 447 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
144. See In re Charbono, 790 F.3d 80, 86 (1st Cir. 2015) (“The courts of appeals, too, have recognized
the authority of federal courts to impose inherent-power sanctions without a finding of contempt.”).
145. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50; Tucker v. Williams, 682 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 2012); Wong, 34
N.E.3d at 45.
146. Trade Well Int’l v. United Cent. Bank, 778 F.3d 620, 626 (7th Cir. 2015).
147. Id. at 627 (stating that “sanctions under the court’s inherent power should not be imposed unless
there is bad-faith conduct or willful disobedience of an order”); Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney Mickell,
688 F.3d 1015, 1035 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A] district court has the inherent power to sanction for: (1) willful
violation of a court order; or (2) bad faith. A determination that a party was willfully disobedient is
different from a finding that a party acted in bad faith. Either supports the imposition of sanctions.”).
148. In re Goode, 821 F.3d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 2016); Williamson v. Recovery Ltd., 826 F.3d 297, 302
(6th Cir. 2016); Haeger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 793 F.3d 1122, 1132–34 (9th Cir. 2015),
amended by 813 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2016); Sciaretta v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 1205, 1212
(11th Cir. 2015); Sun River Energy, Inc. v. Nelson, 800 F.3d 1219, 1227 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Farmer
v. Banco Popular of N. Am., 791 F.3d 1246, 1256 (10th Cir. 2015)); Trade Well Int’l, 778 F.3d at 627;
Ali v. Tolbert, 636 F.3d 622, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Rush, 141 So. 3d at 766; Gap v. Puna Geothermal
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disobedience of a court order is easily evaluated, there is no precise litmus test for
determining what sort of conduct by lawyers or litigants constitutes bad faith.149
Rather, “bad faith” describes “a broad range of willful improper conduct.”150 It is
clear, however, that mere negligence will not suffice.151
In some jurisdictions, a lawyer may face inherent power sanctions absent a
finding of bad faith.152 As the Second Circuit explained in United States v. Seltzer,153
courts’ inherent power “includes the power to police the conduct of attorneys as
officers of the court, and to sanction attorneys for conduct not inherent to client
representation, such as, violations of court orders or other conduct which interferes
with the court’s power to manage its calendar and the courtroom without a finding
of bad faith.”154
Courts may impose inherent power sanctions sua sponte.155 A court may
invoke its inherent power to sanction a lawyer or party even where the misconduct
is sanctionable under a rule or statute.156 Where a lawyer’s or party’s misconduct is
sanctionable under a rule or statute, however, a court ordinarily should rely on that
authority instead of resorting to its inherent power.157 When a court relies on its
inherent power to sanction a lawyer or party rather than leaning on an applicable rule
or statute, it should explain why the rule or statute was inadequate under the
circumstances.158
Courts’ inherent power certainly includes the power to craft alternative
sanctions.159 In fact, courts regularly employ their inherent powers to fashion

Venture, 104 P.3d 912, 921 (Haw. 2004) (quoting Bank of Haw. v. Kunimoto, 984 P.2d 1198, 1215 (Haw.
1999)); In re Estate of Weatherbee, 2014 ME 73, ¶ 17; A.J.H. ex rel. M.J.H., 364 S.W.3d at 682; Merrill,
335 P.3d at 447. But see Wong, 34 N.E.3d at 44 (reasoning that “‘bad faith’ alone is too vague a standard
to establish the scope of a judge’s inherent power to assess attorney’s fees against an attorney who is not
in violation of a court order, statute, or rule of procedure”).
149. Grochocinski v. Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw, LLP, 719 F.3d 785, 799 (7th Cir. 2013).
150. Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2001).
151. Trade Well Int’l, 778 F.3d at 627; Grochocinski, 719 F.3d at 799.
152. See, e.g., In re Charbono, 790 F.3d 80, 88 (1st Cir. 2015) (asserting that “where an inherentpower sanction does not take the form of an award of attorneys’ fees (and thus does not involve a departure
from the American Rule), a finding of bad faith is not ordinarily required”); Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R.
Co., 354 F.3d 739, 745 (8th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “a finding of bad faith is not always necessary to
the court’s exercise of its inherent power to impose sanctions”).
153. 227 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2000).
154. Id. at 42.
155. Projects Mgmt. Co. v. Dyncorp Int’l LLC, 734 F.3d 366, 375 (4th Cir. 2013).
156. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 49 (1991).
157. Id. at 50.
158. See United States v. Rogers Cartage Co., 794 F.3d 854, 863 (7th Cir. 2015) (discussing the district
court’s reliance on its inherent power rather than on Rule 11).
159. See Haeger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 793 F.3d 1122, 1141 (9th Cir. 2015), amended by
813 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Courts have the inherent power to impose various non-monetary
sanctions.”).
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reflective and shaming sanctions against lawyers.160 In Hardy v. Asture,161 for
example, the court determined that the lawyer’s repeated refusal to comply with
procedural requirements and serial failures to exercise legal judgment in a social
security case were clearly willful and demonstrated bad faith, and accordingly
warranted inherent power sanctions.162 The court therefore ordered the lawyer to
attend eight hours of CLE courses on social security litigation in federal court
conducted in a live classroom format in the next six months.163 In Davis v. West Los
Angeles Travelodge,164 the court invoked its inherent power to sanction a defense
lawyer who repeatedly behaved disrespectfully and unprofessionally toward the
plaintiff’s lawyer, who required a service dog.165 The court ordered the lawyer to
complete 20 hours of continuing legal education on civility and professionalism, and
to perform 30 hours of volunteer work with a disability rights organization.166 In
Glucksberg v. Polan,167 Scott Andrews, a lawyer representing the defendants, did not
promptly reveal that one of his clients had died.168 Relying on its inherent power, the
West Virginia federal court hearing the matter sanctioned Andrews by ordering him
to:
[R]esearch, write, and submit to the court an article explaining: (1)
the proper course for a lawyer to follow, under West Virginia and
federal law, in the event that the lawyer’s client dies during the
course of representation, including the necessary notification of
the court and of other parties to the proceeding, investigation of
the status and proper representation of the estate, and any possible
notices or motions to be filed in court; (2) the possible adverse
consequences that can flow from failing to scrupulously follow
these procedures; and (3) the general rules in West Virginia for the
appointment of an administrator or executor to an estate and the

160. See, e.g., Armstead v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 1:14-cv-586-WSD, 2016 WL 7093903, at
*6 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 6, 2016) (ordering the lawyer to write a 5,000 word or longer article for two state bar
journals “discussing the practical and legal consequences of failing to be candid with the court and failing
to comply with court rules and orders”); In re Parker, Civ. A. No. 3:14cv241, 2014 WL 4809844, at *6
(E.D. Va. Sept. 26, 2014) (upholding a bankruptcy court’s use of its inherent power to sanction a lawyer
by requiring him to attend 12 hours of CLE courses on bankruptcy law and ethics in addition to other
penalties); In re Aleman, Case No. 14-00606-TLM, 2015 WL 1956271, at *2 (Bankr. D. Idaho Apr. 29,
2015) (relying on its inherent authority to order the lawyer to obtain six CLE credits within the next six
months); In re Varan, No. 11 B 44072, 2014 WL 2881162, at *14–15 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 24, 2014)
(reasoning that because the offending lawyers’ experience as practitioners and apparent participation in
Illinois mandatory CLE did not deter their serious misconduct, completion of a law school course on
professional responsibility was required).
161. Civ. No. 1:11cv299, 2013 WL 566020 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 13, 2013).
162. Id. at *7.
163. Id. at *8.
164. No. CV 08-8279 CBM (CTx), 2010 WL 623657 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2010).
165. Id. at *1–2.
166. Id. at *1.
167. No. Civ.A. 3:99-0129, 2003 WL 24221184 (S.D. W. Va. June 12, 2003).
168. Id. at *1.

230

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 47; No.2

capacity or incapacity of estate representatives to sue or be sued in
West Virginia.169
Interestingly, this sanction was proposed by the lawyer representing
Andrews at the show cause hearing in the case—presumably in an effort to avoid
monetary sanctions or some other possible penalty believed to be more serious.170
Andrews’s lawyer also told the court at the final show cause hearing that he had
required Andrews to do all of the legal research required to prepare for the hearing,171
surely again with mitigation in mind.
F.

Summary

Depending on the case and jurisdiction, courts may sanction lawyers under
rules of civil procedure, rules of appellate procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and their
inherent powers. A court contemplating sanctions must afford the targeted lawyer
due process, meaning notice that sanctions are a possibility and an opportunity to be
heard on the issue.172 This is true in state courts as well as federal courts.173 More
particularly, “notice” in this context requires the court to inform the lawyer of the
source of authority for the possible sanctions and the specific conduct under scrutiny
so that the lawyer can mount a defense.174 If especially severe sanctions are being
contemplated, particularized notice of the nature of the sanction may be required.175
What constitutes an opportunity to be heard will vary by case.176 A court is not
necessarily required to hold an evidentiary hearing or hear oral argument; in some
situations, briefing may be sufficient for the court to rule.177
Lawyers who are threatened with possible sanctions are wise to devote
significant effort to defeating them in the trial court. Losing at the trial court level
substantially lessens a lawyer’s chances for vindication because appellate courts
generally review trial courts’ sanctions orders for abuse of discretion.178 Although
this is not an insurmountable hurdle for a sanctioned lawyer to overcome, it certainly
is an unfavorable standard of review, as any experienced appellate advocate will

169. Id. at *11.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. In re Charbono, 790 F.3d 80, 88 (1st Cir. 2015); Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Jones Day, 800
F.3d 936, 944 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Plaintiffs’ Baycol Steering Comm. v. Bayer Corp., 419 F.3d 794,
802 (8th Cir. 2005)); Collins v. Boyd, 541 F. App’x 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2013).
173. See, e.g., Griffin v. Griffin, 500 S.E.2d 437, 438–39 (N.C. 1998) (reversing sanctions award
against the lawyer based on the violation of the lawyer’s due process rights).
174. Martin v. Giordano, 11-CV-4507 (ARR) (JO), 2016 WL 4411401,at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2016)
(quoting Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 1999)).
175. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, 800 F.3d at 944.
176. Martin, 2016 WL 4411401, at *4.
177. Id. at *6 (citing Schlaifer Nance & Co., 194 F.3d at 335–36).
178. CBS Broad. Inc. v. FilmOn.com, Inc., 814 F.3d 91, 100 (2d Cir. 2016); Sun River Energy, Inc.
v. Nelson, 800 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 2015); United States v. Rogers Cartage Co., 794 F.3d 854, 862
(7th Cir. 2015); Ek v. Boggs, 75 P.3d 1180, 1190 (Haw. 2003); Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
235 P.3d 592, 596 (Nev. 2010); Nath v. Tex. Children’s Hosp., 446 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2014); Ragland
v. Soggin, 784 S.E.2d 698, 701 (Va. 2016).
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attest.179 Even assuming that a trial court’s discretion narrows as the severity of a
possible sanction increases or where the court entertains the possibility of sanctions
on its own,180 the abuse of discretion standard still requires the appellate court to
affirm the trial court unless it (1) acted arbitrarily; (2) made an error of law; or (3)
relied on clearly erroneous factual findings.181 Plus, where a trial court sanctions a
lawyer based on more than one source of authority—such as a rule of civil procedure
and 28 U.S.C. § 1987, or a rule and the court’s inherent power—the lawyer must
prevail across the board on appeal; if an appellate court can affirm a sanction on any
basis it generally will do so.182 This is true even where the trial court cites incorrect
authority as the sole basis for imposing sanctions.183
III.

ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS IN THE SPOTLIGHT

Now with an essential understanding of the sanctions framework, we return
to what must be considered the leading alternative sanctions case, styled as Security
National Bank of Sioux City v. Abbott Laboratories184 at the district court level and
as Security Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Jones Day185 on appeal. This Part will examine
the district and appellate court decisions, and then analyze the case and alternative
sanctions from a broader perspective. In doing so, it refers to both the district court
and Eighth Circuit decisions by the shorthand title Security National Bank of Sioux
City.

179. See Escribano-Reyes v. Prof’l Hepa Certificate Corp., 817 F.3d 380, 391 (1st Cir. 2016) (stating
that the abuse of discretion standard of review is “‘not appellant-friendly’”) (quoting Jensen v. Phillips
Screw Co., 546 F.3d 59, 64 (1st Cir. 2011)); Gallego v. Northland Grp. Inc., 814 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir.
2016) (noting that the abuse of discretion standard is “deferential”); United States v. One 1987 BMW 325,
985 F.2d 655, 657 (1st Cir. 1993) (“All in all, a party protesting an order in respect to sanctions bears a
formidable burden in attempting to convince the court of appeals that the lower court erred.”).
180. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, 800 F.3d at 941; see also Universitas Educ., LLC v. Nova Grp.,
Inc., 784 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 2015) (asserting that appellate review for abuse of discretion is more
exacting where a district court initiates sanctions on its own).
181. See Farmer v. Banco Popular of N. Am., 791 F.3d 1246, 1256 (10th Cir. 2015) (explaining when
a district court abuses its discretion); see also Loyd v. St. Joseph Mercy Oakland, 766 F.3d 580, 588 (6th
Cir. 2014) (“An abuse of discretion will not be found unless (1) the district court’s decision is predicated
on an erroneous conclusion of law, (2) the district court’s factual findings are clearly in error, or (3) the
district court’s decision is, when taken as a whole, ‘clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or fanciful.’”) (quoting
Toth v. Grand Trunk R.R., 306 F.3d 335, 343 (6th Cir.2002)).
182. See, e.g., Jones v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 617 F.3d 843, 857 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that “although
the district court erred in invoking Rule 11, we uphold its entry of sanctions against defense counsel under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the district court’s inherent power”); see also
Balerna v. Gilberti, 708 F.3d 319, 323 (1st Cir. 2013) (explaining that while Rule 11(b) sanctions were
improper, it would not have been an abuse of discretion for the district court to invoke its inherent power
to discipline the lawyer, so the lawyer was not prejudiced by the district court’s reliance on Rule 11(b)).
183. See Isaacson v. Manty, 721 F.3d 533, 539 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Even where a court cites incorrect
authority as the basis for contempt sanctions, we may consider alternative grounds for the imposition of
those sanctions, so long as the court could have sanctioned the same conduct under another source of
authority, the court’s findings are adequate to meet the applicable standard, and the contemnor’s due
process rights are protected.”).
184. 299 F.R.D. 595, 600 (N.D. Iowa 2014), rev’d sub nom. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Jones
Day, 800 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2015).
185. 800 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2015).
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The District Court Decision in Security National Bank of Sioux City

Security National Bank of Sioux City began as a product liability action.
Security National Bank, as conservator for a child, J.M.K., sued Abbott Laboratories,
the maker of baby formula that was allegedly contaminated by dangerous bacteria.186
J.M.K. allegedly suffered brain damage from consuming the tainted formula.187
Abbott ultimately won the case at trial.188 In preparing for trial, however, the parties
filed deposition designations and objections to designations, and thus the district
court read deposition transcripts of several witnesses.189 On the third day of trial,
District Judge Mark W. Bennett, acting sua sponte, entered an order directing one of
Abbott’s counsel from the respected global law firm of Jones Day to show cause why
she should not be sanctioned for a pattern of obstructionist behavior during
depositions.190 Retreating a bit out of the concern that he should not burden the Jones
Day lawyers with the distraction of a sanctions hearing mid-trial, Judge Bennett
decided to table any sanctions debate until the trial concluded.191 Thus, the same day
he entered judgment in Abbott’s favor, he entered a supplemental show cause order
directing the Jones Day lawyer to address three classes of deposition conduct that
potentially warranted sanctions: (1) excessive use of “form” objections when
defending depositions; (2) numerous attempts to coach witnesses when defending
depositions; and (3) frequent interruptions and purported attempts to clarify
questions by the plaintiff’s counsel during depositions.192 Although he did not name
her in the opinion, Judge Bennett focused his ire on the conduct of Jones Day partner
June Ghezzi, an accomplished trial lawyer with an unblemished professional
record.193
1.

“Form” Objections

With respect to “form” objections, the district court focused on two
depositions in which Ghezzi posed “form” objections at least 115 times.194 In other
words, rather than objecting to questions on specific bases related to their form, such
as being leading or compound, or assuming facts not in evidence,195 Ghezzi “simply
objected to ‘form,’” requiring the plaintiff’s lawyer and anyone reading the
deposition transcript to guess the basis for the objection.196 As the court saw it,
Ghezzi also used “form” objections to nitpick the examiner’s word choices in what
the court characterized as efforts to influence the witness’s answer, to “voice
absurdly hyper-technical truths,” and to invent “novel objections” devoid of legal

186. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, 299 F.R.D. at 598.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, 800 F.3d at 939.
190. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, 299 F.R.D. at 598.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, 800 F.3d at 938 (identifying Ghezzi).
194. See Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, 299 F.R.D. at 600.
195. See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Serrano, No. 11-2075-JAR, 2012 WL 28071, at *5 (D. Kan. Jan. 5,
2012) (offering examples of form objections).
196. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, 299 F.R.D. at 600.
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basis.197 In any event, the court observed, her “form” objections “rarely, if ever,
followed a truly objectionable question.”198
Judge Bennett explained his reasons for believing that “form” objections to
questions are impermissible:
[O]bjecting to “form” is like objecting to “improper”—it does no
more than vaguely suggest that the objector takes issue with the
question. It is not itself a ground for objection, nor does it preserve
any objection. Instead, “form” objections refer to a category of
objections, which includes objections to “leading questions, lack
of foundation, assuming facts not in evidence, mischaracterization
or misleading question, non-responsive answer, lack of personal
knowledge, testimony by counsel, speculation, asked and
answered, argumentative question, and witness’ answers that were
beyond the scope of the question.”199
In addition to being useless because they obliquely refer to any number of
possible bases for objection, “form” objections are inefficient and frustrate the goals
underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.200
The Rules contemplate that objections should be concise and
afford the examiner the opportunity to cure the objection. . . .
While unspecified “form” objections are certainly concise, they do
nothing to alert the examiner to a question’s alleged defect.
Because they lack specificity, “form” objections do not allow the
examiner to immediately cure the objection. Instead, the examiner
must ask the objector to clarify, which takes more time and
increases the amount of objection banter between the lawyers.
Briefly stating the particular ground for the objection, on the other
hand, is no less concise and allows the examiner to ask a remedial
question without further clarification.201
Finally, it is difficult for courts to evaluate the validity of “form”
objections.202 A court asked to rule on “form” objections must speculate about the
bases for them.203 That is reason enough to require lawyers to specify the grounds
for their objections.204
Interestingly, after explaining at length why “form” objections are
improper, Judge Bennett noted that not all courts share his dislike for them and some
courts even require lawyers to assert only unspecified “form” objections in
depositions.205 Consequently, Judge Bennett declined to sanction Ghezzi merely for
197. Id. at 600–601.
198. Id. at 601.
199. Id. (quoting NGM Ins. Co. v. Walker Constr. & Dev., LLC, No. 1:11-CV-146, 2012 WL
6553272, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 13, 2012)).
200. Id. at 602.
201. Id. at 602–603.
202. Id. at 603 (quoting Mayor of Baltimore v. Theiss, 729 A.2d 965, 976 (Md. 1999)).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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asserting “form” objections.206 But Ghezzi’s use of “form” objections highlighted
two other concerns: witness coaching and excessive deposition interruptions.207
Judge Bennett was willing to sanction Ghezzi for using form objections as a means
of coaching witnesses and as a tactic to interrupt depositions.208
2.

Witness Coaching

Moving on to the problem of witness coaching, Judge Bennett observed that
while some courts approve of “form” objections, they consistently prohibit lawyers
from coaching witnesses during depositions.209 Lawyers may not comment on
questions in ways that might influence witnesses’ answers.210 In this case, Ghezzi
made numerous “‘clarification-inducing’ objections—objections that prompted the
witnesses to request that the examiner clarify otherwise cogent questions.”211 After
listening to Ghezzi’s objection, the witness would ask the plaintiff’s lawyer to clarify
an easily understandable question or even refuse to answer the question.212 Judge
Bennett recited several examples from the transcripts he read.213 Here was one:
Q. Well, if there were high numbers of OAL, Eb samples in the
factory, wouldn’t that be a cause for concern about the
microbiological quality of the finished product?
COUNSEL: Object to the form of the question. It’s a hypothetical;
lacks facts.
A. Yeah, those are hypotheticals.
...
Q. Would that be a concern of yours?
COUNSEL: Same objection.
A. Not going to answer.
Q. You’re not going to answer?
A. Yeah, I mean, it’s speculation. It would be guessing.
COUNSEL: You don’t have to guess.214

206. Id.
207. Id. at 603–604.
208. Id. at 604.
209. Id.
210. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c)(2) and citing the FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee notes
to 1993 amendments).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 604–608.
214. Id. at 604.
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Judge Bennett was also upset by Ghezzi’s practice of concluding objections
in ways that suggested to witnesses that they should claim to be incapable of
answering the question.215 Predictably, the witnesses took the hints.216 For example:
Q. If it’s high enough to kill bacteria, why does Abbott prior to
that go through a process of pasteurization?
COUNSEL: If you know, and you’re not a production person so
don’t feel like you have to guess.
A. I don’t know.
Q. Does it describe the heat treatment that you referred to a few
moments ago, the heat treatment that occurs in the dryer phase?
...
COUNSEL: Okay. Do you know his question? He’s asking you if
this is what you’re describing.
A. Yeah, I don’t know.
Q. . . . Is there any particular reason that that language is stated
with respect to powdered infant formula?
COUNSEL: If you know. Don’t—if you know.
A. No, I—no, not to my knowledge.
COUNSEL: If you know. I mean, do you know or not know?
A. I don’t know.217
In other instances, the court faulted Ghezzi for coaching witnesses to give
particular answers, reinterpreting or rephrasing the plaintiff’s lawyer’s questions, or
providing witnesses with additional information to consider when answering
questions.218 Consider this exchange as an example of conduct the court found to be
improper:
Plaintiff’s Counsel: [I]s there something that they . . . just chose
not to put—

215. See id. at 606.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 607 (internal citations omitted); see also Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Serrano, No. 11-2075-JAR,
2012 WL 28071, at *5 (D. Kan. Jan. 5, 2012) (“Instructions to a witness that they may answer a question
‘if they know’ or ‘if they understand the question’ are raw, unmitigated coaching, and are never
appropriate. This conduct, if it persists after the deposing attorney requests that it stop, is misconduct and
sanctionable.”).
218. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, 299 F.R.D. at 607–08.
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Defense Counsel: [S]he didn’t write this.
[Witness]: Yes, I didn’t write this.
Plaintiff’s Counsel: [D]o you know if that test was performed
in . . . Columbus?
[Witness]: I don’t.
Defense Counsel: Yes, you do. Read it.219
Ghezzi defended her conduct by arguing that she was simply steering the
plaintiff’s lawyer “to the correct ground” when he was “on the wrong track factually”
when deposing Abbott witnesses.220 When examinations of Abbott witnesses
“bogged down,” she merely “attempted to speed up the process by helping to clarify
or facilitate things.”221 These arguments did not persuade the court. A lawyer
defending a deposition is not empowered to decide whether another lawyer is going
astray or to redirect that lawyer’s questioning to fit the defending lawyer’s view of
the case.222 Furthermore, the court thought that it was nonsensical to suggest that
Ghezzi’s running commentary hastened the depositions.223 Her comments were
framed as objections—they were not well-intentioned efforts to clarify questions.224
In summary, Ghezzi’s perceived witness coaching was sanctionable.225
3.

Excessive Interruptions

Beyond Ghezzi’s use of objections to coach Abbott witnesses, the court
believed that she excessively interrupted the depositions she defended.226 In
discussing her “grossly excessive” interruptions, the court noted that (a) in one
deposition, her name appeared in the transcript 92 times, or roughly once per page;
(b) in another deposition, her name appeared in the transcript 381 times, or
approximately three times per page; and (c) her name appeared with similar
frequency in the transcripts of the other depositions she defended.227 And, as noted
earlier, the court considered almost all of her objections and interruptions to be
improper.228 Because Ghezzi’s objections and interruptions delayed, frustrated, and
impeded the fair examinations of the witnesses being deposed, they provided an
independent basis for sanctions.229

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Jones Day, 800 F.3d 936, 940 n.3 (8th Cir. 2015).
See Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, 299 F.R.D. at 608–09.
Id. at 609.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Show Cause Hearing and Sanctions

After receiving two responses from Jones Day to his supplemental show
cause order, Judge Bennett conducted a telephonic hearing.230 During that hearing,
he asked Ghezzi to “follow up with an e-mail message suggesting an appropriate
sanction” should he decide to sanction her.231 Judge Bennett did not indicate the types
of sanctions he was considering.232 A few days later, another Jones Day partner
responded with an e-mail message urging the court not to impose sanctions and
declining to suggest a possible sanction.233
Judge Bennett entered his sanctions order one week later. He explained that
while he had the discretion to impose substantial monetary sanctions on Ghezzi, he
was more interested in reforming her deposition practices.234 He was also deeply
committed to deterring similar behavior by other lawyers because “so many litigators
are trained to make obstructionist objections.”235 He therefore settled on an “outsidethe-box” sanction designed for deterrent and reformative effect:236
Counsel must write and produce a training video in which Counsel,
or another partner in Counsel’s firm, appears and explains the
holding and rationale of this opinion, and provides specific steps
lawyers must take to comply with its rationale in future depositions
in any federal and state court. The video must specifically address
the impropriety of unspecified “form” objections, witness
coaching, and excessive interruptions. The lawyer appearing in the
video may mention the few jurisdictions that actually require only
unspecified “form” objections and may suggest that such
objections are proper in only those jurisdictions. The lawyer in the
video must state that the video is being produced and distributed
pursuant to a federal court’s sanction order regarding a partner in
the firm, but the lawyer need not state the name of the partner, the
case the sanctions arose under, or the court issuing this order. Upon
completing the video, Counsel must file it with this court, under
seal, for my review and approval. If and when I approve the video,
Counsel must (1) notify certain lawyers at Counsel’s firm about
the video via e-mail and (2) provide those lawyers with access to
the video. The lawyers who must receive this notice and access
include each lawyer at Counsel’s firm . . . who engages in federal
or state litigation or who works in any practice group in which at
least two of the lawyers have filed an appearance in any state or
federal case in the United States.237

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 598.
Id.
Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Jones Day, 800 F.3d 936, 945 (8th Cir. 2015).
Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, 299 F.R.D. at 598.
Id. at 609.
Id.
Id. at 609–10.
Id. at 610.
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Judge Bennett explained that he would never have acted sua sponte had
Ghezzi’s conduct generally been appropriate.238 Depositions can be brutal, and even
good lawyers occasionally object improperly.239 Ghezzi unquestionably was a fine
lawyer; indeed, the judge praised her superior performance at trial.240 But her
excellent trial work did not excuse her deposition conduct.241 Because her improper
deposition tactics “went far beyond what judges should tolerate of any lawyer,”
sanctions were required.242
In conclusion, Judge Bennett indicated that he would automatically stay the
order pending any appeal.243 As expected, Ghezzi and Jones Day appealed.244
Security National Bank chose not to submit a brief on appeal, but five amici
submitted briefs in support of the district court.245
B.

The Eighth Circuit Decision in Security National Bank of Sioux City

The Eighth Circuit began its analysis by noting that the district court had
sanctioned Ghezzi under Rule 30(d)(2) and stating that it reviews orders imposing
sanctions under Rule 30(d)(2) for abuse of discretion.246 A district court’s discretion
constricts as the severity of the chosen sanction increases or when it imposes
sanctions on its own.247 When a district court imposes sanctions sua sponte or when
the sanction it selects is harsher than most, a reviewing court applies the abuse of
discretion standard with special rigor.248
Ghezzi and Jones Day contended that Rule 30(d)(2) did not empower the
district court to impose sanctions on its own, but the Eighth Circuit succinctly
declined to so limit the court’s power.249 Even if the lawyers in a case choose to
ignore discovery violations, courts may still impose Rule 30(d)(2) sanctions on their
own to deter ongoing and future misconduct.250 “Both the plain language and purpose
of Rule 30(d)(2) authorize courts to impose sanctions sua sponte.”251
The Eighth Circuit was bothered by the timing of the sanctions order,
however. Judge Bennett did not assume responsibility for the Security National Bank
of Sioux City case until 16 months after the depositions in which Ghezzi’s most
offensive conduct took place and one year after discovery closed.252 He did not
impose sanctions until some seven months later, meaning that Ghezzi was sanctioned
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 610–11.
Id. at 611.
Id. at 610.
Id. at 611.
Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Jones Day, 800 F.3d 936, 941 (8th Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id. (citing Craig v. St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr., 384 Fed. App’x. 531, 532 (8th Cir. 2010)).
Id. (citing Jones v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 460 F.3d 1004, 1010 (8th Cir. 2006)).
Id. (citing Norsyn, Inc. v. Desai, 351 F.3d 825, 831 (8th Cir. 2003)).
Id. at 942.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 943.
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almost two years after she had defended the subject depositions without a peep from
the plaintiff’s lawyer.253 As the court explained:
With few exceptions, sanctions should be imposed “within a time
frame that has a nexus to the behavior sought to be deterred.” . . .
Rule 30(d)(2) sanctions assessed near the time of violation deter
both ongoing and subsequent abuses. . . . Prompt action “helps
enhance the credibility of the rule,” and by deterring further
discovery abuse, “achieve its therapeutic purpose.” . . . This is
especially true when sanctions are imposed sua sponte after the
fact, for delay allows potential violations to pass unchecked and
undeterred. . . . The primary purpose of Rule 30(d)(2) was not well
served by the post hoc procedures here.254
Moreover, Judge Bennett gave Ghezzi no advance notice of the type of
sanction he was considering.255 Neither the original show cause order nor the
supplemental show cause order signaled the court’s intent to impose the unusual
sanction selected.256
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that before “imposing the ‘most severe
sanctions,’” a district court should give the target lawyer “‘clear notice’ as to the
form of the sanction.”257 Particularized notice of the sanction being considered may
be especially important where a lawyer’s reputation may be affected by the sanction
given the symbolic statement that sanctions may make about a lawyer’s integrity or
the quality of her work.258 A lawyer’s opportunity to be heard is of diminished value
without notice of the nature of a potential sanction, because the lawyer needs that
information to thoughtfully respond.259
In this case, Ghezzi had no appreciable notice of the sanction the district
court was contemplating.260 Although Judge Bennett gave Ghezzi and Jones Day
advance notice of his reasons for considering Rule 30(d)(2) sanctions, he never
indicated in his show cause orders or during the hearing that producing and
distributing an instructional video on deposition misconduct was in the cards.261 The
unusual shaming sanction was revealed for the first time in the district court’s
published opinion.262
The Eighth Circuit explained that once information about an extraordinary
litigation sanction is publicized, damage to the lawyer’s career, reputation, and future
professional opportunities may be hard to repair and might even be irreparable.263

253. See id (citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.42 (2004)).
254. Id. (citations omitted).
255. Id. at 944.
256. Id.
257. Id. (quoting Harlan v. Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255, 1262 (8th Cir. 1993)).
258. Id. (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig. Actions, 278 F.3d 175, 191 (3d
Cir. 2002)).
259. See id.
260. See id. at 945.
261. Id.
262. Id. (citing In re Tutu Wells, 120 F.3d 368, 380 (3d Cir.1997)).
263. Id. (citing Adams v. Ford Motor Co., 653 F.3d 299, 308–09 (3d Cir. 2011)).
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Recognizing the importance to Ghezzi of her professional reputation, the court
considered the possibility that Judge Bennett’s shaming sanction could indelibly
stain her career.264 Given the professional stakes, she was entitled to particularized
notice of the nature of the sanction Judge Bennett was considering so that she could
meaningfully respond to the show cause orders.265
In coming to a decision, the Eighth Circuit noted that it could vacate the
sanctions order and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.266
But it saw little value in that approach because Ghezzi had already been significantly
punished by virtue of having endure the sanctions process and litigation, and
additional sanctions proceedings so long after the challenged conduct took place
would not serve the deterrent purpose of Rule 30(d)(2).267 The court therefore
reversed the district court’s sanctions order.268
C.

Analysis: Security National Bank of Sioux City and Beyond

Although Jones Day and Ghezzi were surely gratified by the Eighth
Circuit’s decision in Security National Bank of Sioux City, lawyers should not read
the case too expansively. The Eighth Circuit did not endorse Ghezzi’s conduct.269
More to the immediate point, the court did not condemn or invalidate reflective or
shaming sanctions. To the contrary, the opinion can be read to suggest that the Eighth
Circuit would have upheld the district court’s shaming sanction had the district court
acted sooner and given Ghezzi particularized notice of the sanction it was
considering. The sanction might also have been affirmed had the plaintiff timely
moved for sanctions rather than the district court raising the possibility of sanctions
on its own at trial.270
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit’s decision is incompletely reasoned. First,
the court seemingly faulted the district court for not holding a Rule 16 conference in
the discovery phase of the case which supposedly would have allowed Judge Bennett
(or the magistrate judge or senior district judge on the case earlier) to learn whether
there were problems to address.271 Of course, the district court could have learned of
Ghezzi’s offending conduct at a Rule 16 conference only if the plaintiff’s lawyer
raised it and the plaintiff’s lawyer never complained about her conduct at any point
in the case.272 There is no reason to believe based on the facts in the opinion that the
plaintiff’s lawyer would have complained had he been forced to appear for a status
264. Id.
265. Id. (citing In re Tutu Wells, 120 F.3d at 380–81)).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See id. (“[a]ssuming without deciding that there was sanctionable conduct” in the case). For
another case in which a court sanctioned a lawyer for conduct similar to Ghezzi’s, see AKH Co. v.
Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., Case No. 13-2003-JAR-KGG, 2016 WL 141629, at *3–4 (D. Kan.
Jan. 12, 2016).
270. See Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, 800 F.3d at 938, 942–43 (reiterating three times that the
plaintiff’s lawyer never complained to the court about Ghezzi’s deposition practices).
271. See id. at 943.
272. See id. at 942–43 (noting that the plaintiff’s lawyer never sought judicial intervention in
discovery).
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conference at some point during discovery. The lack of a Rule 16 conference was
therefore irrelevant.
Second, the Eighth Circuit’s criticism of the delay between Ghezzi’s
deposition conduct and Judge Bennett’s expression of concern about it was
exaggerated. Although it is preferable for deterrence purposes for sanctions to be
“imposed within a time frame that has a nexus to the behavior sought to be
deterred,”273 a court’s failure to sanction a lawyer at the earliest possible time does
not operate to pardon the lawyer’s misbehavior.274 Indeed, district courts may
consider collateral issues such as sanctions even after a case has been voluntarily
dismissed.275
This was not a case like In re Yagman,276 where the district court waited
until the conclusion of the case to suggest Rule 11 sanctions against the plaintiff’s
lawyer for filing the lawsuit.277 In Security National Bank of Sioux City, the parties
filed their deposition designations and objections in preparation for a January 6, 2014
trial, thus presenting Judge Bennett with a record of Ghezzi’s behavior very late in
the game; Judge Bennett overruled Abbott’s objections to the plaintiff’s deposition
designations on December 30, 2013, in the process expressing his unhappiness with
them; he issued his first show cause order on January 9, 2014; and he issued his
supplemental show cause order on January 21, 2014, the day he entered judgment
for Abbott.278 That is a relatively compressed time frame. The fact that the district
court did not hold a sanctions hearing until July 17, 2014, was due in substantial part
to Jones Day obtaining extensions of time to respond to the supplemental show cause
order and later obtaining a continuance of the hearing.279 In fact, reserving a decision
on sanctions until the end of trial is sometimes appropriate because, “[i]n some
situations, liability under proper sanctioning authority will not be immediately
apparent or may not be precisely and accurately discernible until a later time.”280
Third, while Judge Bennett should have given Ghezzi notice of the
sanctions he was considering, it is questionable whether his failure to do so was
consequential. When he asked Ghezzi to suggest an appropriate sanction should he
decide to go that route, Jones Day declined to propose a sanction.281 Jones Day took
that approach even though the firm must have known that Judge Bennett might be
273. Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 881 (5th Cir. 1988).
274. It bears repeating that Judge Bennett acted on Ghezzi’s misconduct when he learned of it. He
likely would have acted on it sooner had it been brought to his attention by the plaintiff’s lawyer, but, as
the Eighth Circuit noted, (1) the plaintiff’s lawyer kept silent; and (2) sanctions against a lawyer may be
appropriate even where opposing counsel does not complain about the lawyer’s behavior or move for
sanctions himself. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, 800 F.3d at 942–43.
275. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395–96 (1990).
276. 796 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1986). In Security National Bank of Sioux City, the Eighth Circuit cited
In re Yagman as support for its statement that “[t]he primary purpose of Rule 30(d)(2) was not well served
by the post hoc procedures here.” Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, 800 F.3d at 943–44.
277. In re Yagman, 796 F.2d at 1180.
278. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, 800 F.3d at 938–40; Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Abbott Labs.,
299 F.R.D. 595, 598 (N.D. Iowa 2014), rev’d sub nom. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Jones Day, 800
F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2015).
279. See Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, 299 F.R.D. at 598.
280. In re Yagman, 796 F.2d at 1183.
281. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, 299 F.R.D. at 598.
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weighing a shaming sanction. Assuming that the excellent Jones Day lawyers
representing the firm and Ghezzi in the district court did the research one would
expect of them, they surely found the decision in St. Paul Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v.
Commercial Financial Corp.,282 discussed earlier,283 where Judge Bennett criticized
a lawyer’s discovery objections as “boilerplate, obstructionist, frivolous, overbroad,
and, significantly, contrary to well-established and long standing federal law.”284 In
St. Paul, he ordered the lawyer to write a bar journal article explaining why it was
improper to object as he did.285 Yet, even with published authority indicating the
possibility of an alternative sanction, Ghezzi and Jones Day never inquired whether
one might be on the judge’s mind. None of this is to say that Jones Day should have
conceded that Ghezzi deserved to be sanctioned. It is to say, however, that notice of
the possibility of an alternative sanction should perhaps not have been given the
weight in this case that it was.
Fourth, the court’s embrace of the principle that before “imposing the ‘most
severe sanctions,’ a district court should provide ‘clear notice’ as to the form of the
sanction,”286 arguably was a reach. That principle typically applies where the
potential sanction will substantively affect the party’s case, as where, for example,
the court might submit an adverse inference instruction, strike the party’s pleadings,
or dismiss the case.287 The same is true with respect to the court’s observation that a
district court’s discretion narrows as the severity of the sanction increases.288 Either
way, in Security National Bank of Sioux City the sanction had no effect on the case.
The court’s focus on the severity of the sanction, however, raises another
question: short of issuing an adverse inference instruction, dismissing a party’s case,
striking a party’s pleadings, or revoking a lawyer’s pro hac vice admission, what
makes a sanction among the “most severe”? Does any shaming sanction require clear
notice to the lawyer of its intended form? What if the shaming sanction is
embarrassing, but, when viewed objectively, cannot reasonably be said to indelibly
stain the lawyer’s reputation or career, or impair her ability to practice?289 In the
same vein, the court’s statement that “[s]o unusual a sanction”—that is, the
production of an intra-firm instructional video—required “particularized notice of
the nature of the sanction” being contemplated,290 raises the question of what makes
a sanction sufficiently unusual to trigger the particularized notice requirement. A

282. 198 F.R.D. 508 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
283. See supra notes 75–84 and accompanying text.
284. St. Paul, 198 F.R.D. at 511.
285. Id. at 518.
286. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Jones Day, 800 F.3d 936, 944 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Harlan
v. Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255, 1262 (8th Cir.1993)).
287. See Harlan v. Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255, 1260–62 (8th Cir. 1993) (imposing monetary sanctions and
referring the defense lawyer to state disciplinary authorities rather than striking the defendant’s answer or
precluding witnesses from testifying, as the plaintiff requested).
288. See Sentis Grp., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 559 F.3d 888, 898–99 (8th Cir. 2009) (discussing dismissal
as a discovery sanction).
289. See Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, 800 F.3d at 944–45 (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am.
Sales Practice Litig. Actions, 278 F.3d 175, 191–93 (3d Cir. 2002); In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig.,
120 F.3d 368, 381 n.10 (3d Cir.1997)).
290. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, 800 F.3d at 945.
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reflective sanction such as mandatory CLE attendance certainly does not rise to that
level.291
Whatever its flaws, the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Security National Bank
of Sioux City is in several respects a positive decision for lawyers and courts alike.
Again, from courts’ perspective, the Eighth Circuit did not hold that alternative
sanctions are flatly inappropriate, meaning that district courts in that judicial circuit
retain the discretion to fashion case- and situation-specific alternative sanctions, and
that other courts cannot seize on the opinion to forbid the use of alternative sanctions.
It is important for trial courts to have flexibility when regulating the conduct of
lawyers appearing before them.292 It is also important for trial courts to have
sanctioning options apart from monetary sanctions and non-monetary sanctions that
go to the merits or substance of the case, or to the offending lawyer’s ability to
practice. The availability of alternative sanctions may be especially important where
an errant lawyer’s practice is so thin that she cannot afford to pay reasonable
monetary sanctions,293 or at the other extreme, where the misbehaving lawyer’s
wealth makes a monetary sanction proportionate to the misconduct at issue the
equivalent of pocket change.294
If the court’s elevated scrutiny of the district court’s sanctions order
prompts trial courts to think carefully when fashioning extraordinary alternative
sanctions,295 that caution is good for all concerned. Trial courts will satisfy
themselves that they are focusing on significant misconduct that truly requires
extraordinary sanctions rather than imposing sanctions out of accumulated

291. See JOSEPH, supra note 30, § 16(B)(5), at 280 (“An order requiring lawyers to participate in
mandatory continuing legal education is another lesser sanction.”) (emphasis added).
292. See generally Young v. Gordon, 330 F.3d 76, 81 (1st Cir. 2003) (stating that “the choice of an
appropriate sanction must be handled on a case-by-case basis”).
293. A lawyer’s ability to pay is a factor for a court to consider in imposing monetary sanctions under
Rule 11. JOSEPH, supra note 30, § 16(D)(10), at 322. A lawyer claiming the inability to pay monetary
sanctions bears the burden of producing evidence of her inability to pay. Fed. Election Comm’n v.
Toledano, 317 F.3d 939, 948–49 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Gaskell v. Weir, 10 F.3d 626, 629 (9th Cir.
1993)). Whether courts should consider offenders’ ability to pay when imposing sanctions under 28
U.S.C. § 1927 depends on the jurisdiction. The Seventh and Tenth Circuits have concluded that courts
should not consider offenders’ ability to pay when awarding fees and expenses under § 1927. Hamilton
v. Boise Cascade Express, 519 F.3d 1197, 1206 (10th Cir. 2008); Shales v. Gen. Chauffeurs, Sales Drivers
& Helpers Local Union No. 330, 557 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 2009). The Second and Ninth Circuits, on
the other hand, have concluded that courts may do so. Haynes v. City of San Francisco, 688 F.3d 984, 987
(9th Cir. 2012); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1281 (2d Cir. 1986).
294. Any sanction that a court imposes should be proportionate to the gravity of the offense. Montano
v. City of Chi., 535 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2008) (discussing inherent power sanctions); Goya Foods, Inc.
v. Wallack Mgmt. Co., 344 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 2003) (stating that so long as a trial court’s monetary
sanction is reasonably proportionate to the offending conduct, its quantification will not be disturbed on
appeal).
295. See Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 2 F.3d 1397, 1411 (5th Cir. 1993)
(“Although novel sanctions are not objectionable per se, they are subject to close examination on review
simply because their reasonableness has not been demonstrated.”).
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frustration with a lawyer or a case.296 Lawyers are more likely to receive the benefit
of the doubt in close cases, which is consistent with sanctions doctrine generally.297
Similarly, if the opinion pushes trial courts to provide particularized notice
of the nature and severity of the sanctions they are weighing in more cases,298 it
increases the likelihood that targeted lawyers will provide more detailed and focused
responses to courts’ show cause orders or to opponents’ motions.299 That, in turn,
should lead courts to make better sanctions decisions in general.
At the same time, any benefits that might flow from courts providing
lawyers with particularized notice of possible alternative sanctions are arguably
speculative. Competent lawyers who believe they have done nothing wrong are
guaranteed to vigorously oppose any possible sanctions. In the process, they will
advise the court of applicable law and material facts justifying their conduct. Thus,
a particularized notice requirement seems of little benefit either to the court or to the
offending lawyer. If a lawyer who is threatened with possible shaming sanctions can
easily afford proportionate monetary sanctions or her firm or client will pay any
monetary sanction on her behalf, she is sure to argue that if any sanction is imposed,
it should be monetary. That would seem to defeat the deterrent purpose of the
sanction, unless the court recognizes the argument for what it is and sticks with the
shaming sanction—but then the parties have come full circle, because the court
presumably was considering a shaming sanction in the first place precisely because
it saw no value in a monetary sanction. In short, particularized notice of possible
alternative sanctions mostly serves to signal lawyers who lack confidence in their
own defense that they may wish as a fallback position to urge an alternative sanction
less severe than the one the court is holding out.
Finally, in most jurisdictions, a trial court that is seriously disturbed by a
lawyer’s conduct but concerned that it cannot or should not levy sanctions, may
condemn the lawyer’s conduct in a published opinion without exposing its decision
to appellate review provided that it does not (a) expressly denominate its criticism as
a reprimand; or (b) make specific findings of misconduct.300 Appellate courts refuse
296. See, e.g., Gowan v. Mid Century Ins. Co., No. 5:14-cv-05025-LLP, 2015 WL 7274448, at *5
(D.S.D. Nov. 16, 2015) (concluding that the defendant’s repeated assertion of baseless discovery
objections even after the court held such objections to be invalid, “while unjustified under the Federal
Rules,” were “not severe enough to warrant the kind of sanctions imposed [by the district court] in Security
Nat’l”).
297. See, e.g., K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 1995)
(stating that “all doubts should be resolved in favor of the signing attorney” when considering Rule 11
sanctions); Mustapha v. HSBC Bank, USA, Civ. A. No. 4:12-cv-01924, 2013 WL 632856, at *7 (S.D.
Tex. Feb. 20, 2013) (giving the plaintiffs “the benefit of doubt” in declining to impose sanctions while
cautioning them that their good faith would not be presumed in the future).
298. See, e.g., Adams v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, No. 2:14-CV-02013, 2016 WL 1465433, at *9–
11 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 14, 2016) (citing Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Jones Day, 800 F.3d 936, 945 (8th
Cir. 2015) (giving lawyers notice of sanctions being considered)).
299. JOSEPH, supra note 30, § 17(D)(1), at 388.
300. See Douglas R. Richmond, Appealing from Judicial Scoldings, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 741, 760
(2010) (noting the majority approach to lawyers’ appeals from judicial criticism). But cf. Adams v. Ford
Motor Co., 653 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 2011) (concluding that the district court’s finding of lawyer
misconduct unaccompanied by a formal reprimand or monetary penalty was a sanction for appellate
purposes because it “directly undermine[d] [the lawyer’s] professional reputation and standing in the
community”).
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to entertain lawyers’ appeals of routine judicial commentary on their conduct.301
Thus, in Security National Bank of Sioux City, had the district court declined to
sanction Ghezzi and instead simply criticized her conduct as obstructionist and
unjustified in a pretrial ruling on the parties’ deposition designations and objections,
she would not have had standing to appeal.302 In many cases, judicial criticism of
lawyers’ conduct in published opinions may deter future misconduct as effectively
as shaming sanctions. From courts’ perspective, this approach has the advantage of
avoiding time-consuming ancillary litigation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Courts may impose non-monetary sanctions on lawyers in litigation. These
include what we have called alternative sanctions because they differ from traditional
non-monetary sanctions that affect a lawyer’s ability to litigate a case, such as
revoking the lawyer’s pro hac vice admission. Alternative sanctions may further be
categorized as reflective sanctions where they are intended to cause the offending
lawyers to reflect on their conduct with a goal of reform, or as shaming sanctions
where they are intended to shame errant lawyers into improving their behavior and,
in addition, to deter other lawyers from engaging in similar misconduct. The sanction
imposed by the district court in Security National Bank of Sioux City is now the
leading example of a shaming sanction, notwithstanding the Eighth Circuit’s reversal
on appeal.
Courts considering alternative sanctions should be sure to give lawyers
particularized notice of the sanctions they are considering and afford the targeted
lawyers an opportunity to be heard on the issue. They should also act promptly upon
learning of misconduct by lawyers. Assuming they do these things, any alternative
sanctions they impose are likely to be upheld on appeal in light of the deferential
abuse of discretion standard of review that appellate courts apply in sanctions cases.
From lawyers’ perspective, it is obviously desirable to avoid engaging in
conduct that may draw a motion for sanctions or that may prompt a trial court to raise
the possibility of sanctions sua sponte. When lawyers are handling litigation in
jurisdictions in which they do not regularly practice, a first step toward avoiding
potential misconduct is to retain knowledgeable local counsel who can advise them
on customary practice in the jurisdiction. Depending on the case, reasonable research
of local practices may be a wise investment. Returning to Security National Bank of
Sioux City, Ghezzi might have avoided the deposition conduct that upset the district
judge. With the exercise of some diligence or the guidance of capable local counsel,
she would have known of Van Pilsum v. Iowa State University of Science &
Technology,303 in which the court sanctioned the plaintiff’s lawyer for repeatedly
restating the defense lawyer’s questions to “clarify” them for the plaintiff, and for
consistently interrupting defense counsel to interpose “objections which were thinly
veiled instructions to the [plaintiff], who would then incorporate” her lawyer’s
comments in her answers.304 She might also have learned from research locating the
301.
302.
303.
304.

Richmond, supra note 300, at 759.
See Williams v. United States (In re Williams), 156 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 1998).
152 F.R.D. 179 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
Id. at 180.
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opinion in Rakes v. Life Investors Insurance Co. of America,305 if not from local
counsel, that “the general practice in Iowa permits an objector to state in a few words
the manner in which the question is defective as to form. . . . Care must be taken by
the objector, however, to not attempt to suggest an answer, or to influence or ‘coach’
the witness.”306 A glance at either case—or the advice of local counsel versed in Iowa
federal court practice—surely would have caused an excellent lawyer such as Ghezzi
to rethink her regular deposition practices and style honed in other jurisdictions.
To be sure, if Ghezzi had never handled cases in Iowa federal courts or had
done so previously without her deposition practices being challenged, and if her
deposition practices were the norm in the jurisdictions in which she regularly
appeared, she would have had no reason to anticipate the possibility of sanctions.
But that returns us to the importance of capable local counsel who can provide the
sort of advice and nuts-and-bolts guidance that visiting lawyers may require, and to
the gathering of intelligence through reasonable legal research in appropriate cases.
Lawyers who are threatened with sanctions should not respond on their
own. Rather, they should seek the assistance of other lawyers in their firm or retain
separate counsel, or both, in defending against any allegations of misconduct. This
does not mean that targeted lawyers should be excluded from their own defenses;
after all, they have valuable knowledge to contribute and their interests are at stake.
Rather, separate counsel are likely to provide a level of objectivity when analyzing
the situation and formulating a response that a lawyer who is in another party’s or a
court’s crosshairs cannot.
In some cases, it may be necessary for lawyers who are facing possible
sanctions to consider whether they should propose an alternative sanction as a means
of escaping more serious penalties. This recommendation may gall the affected
lawyers, but, depending on the facts and the court, it may be a prudent choice.
Attending a CLE course or writing a bar journal article probably is preferable to a
more serious monetary or shaming sanction, or to a case-altering non-monetary
sanction such as revocation of the culpable lawyer’s pro hac vice admission.
In summary, alternative sanctions are a regular feature on the litigation
landscape. For lawyers, the keys are first to avoid misconduct supporting sanctions
of any kind; second to defeat any attempts to impose sanctions, including alternative
sanctions, at the trial court level; and, third, to minimize or mitigate any sanctions
that may be imposed. If it is necessary to appeal a sanction, a lawyer must strive to
build a case in the trial court that is strong enough to overcome the deferential abuse
of discretion standard that the appellate court will apply.

305. No. C06-0099, 2008 WL 429060 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 14, 2008).
306. Id. at *5.

